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"Let there be progress, therefore; a widespread and eager progress in every century and epoch, both of individuals and of the general body, of every Christian and of the whole Church, a progress in intelligence, knowledge and wisdom, but always within their natural limits, and without sacrifice of the identity of Catholic teaching, feeling and opinion."—ST. VINCENT OF LERINS, *Commonit*, c. 6.

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THE CORONATION OATH OF THE BRITISH SOVEREIGN.¹

Those may be counted almost on the fingers of one hand who remember to have seen the once famous monument in the populous metropolis of the far-reaching British Empire, which Pope, the Catholic poet, spoke of with scorn in his "The Man of Ross:"

"Where London's column pointing to the sky,
Like a tall bully lifts its head and lies."

Thus ran its inscription: "This pillar was set up in perpetual remembrance of that most dreadful burning of this Protestant city, begun and carried on by the teaching and malice of the Popish faction, in the beginning of September, 1666, in order to the carrying out of their horrid plot for the extirpating the Protestant religion and old English liberty and the introduction of popery and slavery." Men grew ashamed of the brazen lie, and it was erased in 1831. Most Englishmen, except a prejudiced and fanatical minority, have long ago, too, grown to be ashamed of another wanton insult to the twelve millions of Catholics scattered throughout the British Empire,

¹ What is commonly called the "Coronation Oath" is a form of solemn "Declaration" which, according to the enactment of the Bill of Rights (1689), should be made by every British sovereign either at the coronation or at the first assembly of Parliament after the accession, "whichever shall first happen," as the Bill of Rights expresses it.—(EDITOR).

which had its origin in the same panic, caused by the lies and murderous perjuries of the infamous Titus Oates—an insult not to Catholics only and the supreme head of the Catholic Church, but also to our revered king; and moreover a standing record, quite foreign to the present broad-minded common-sense of the nation as a whole, of a time now generally recognized as a very discreditable period of our history. This from an earthly point of view; but, what is far worse, a permanent blasphemy against God's most wonderful dispensation of love in the institution of the Holy Eucharist, and an insult to His Virgin Mother and the Court of Heaven. We refer of course, to the "Royal Declaration," required of every sovereign amidst the pageantry and solemn tradition of ceremonial on the commencement of each new reign. But public opinion moves slowly, and not until the year of grace 1910 did it become sufficiently positive and united to force those most responsible for legislation into action to erase what Cardinal Wiseman long ago spoke of as "an act of national apostasy," and a former Prime Minister as "a stain upon the statute book of the realm."

In days of greater toleration and increased enlightenment we are apt to forget, and are glad to forget, the narrow-mindedness and persecution of a former age. But this forgetfulness frequently carries with it a want of appreciation of greater liberty, and too soon we forget to give a full measure of praise to those who have borne the burden and the heat of the struggle. It may then be of some interest and value to gather together, in retrospect, from the mass of ephemeral literature published during the years of the conflict a brief account of the origin of the oath, the leading facts in the history of its change and the motives which influenced the contending parties.

The Bill of Rights of 1689 (1 William and Mary, S2, c2.) enacted that "Every sovereign shall on the first day of the first meeting of the first Parliament after coming to the Crown, on the throne in the House of Peers, in the presence of the Lords and Commons, or at the coronation (whichever shall first happen) make, subscribe and audibly repeat the Declaration made in 30 King Charles II [1678] entitled 'an Act for the

more effectual preserving of the King's person and government by disabling papists from sitting in either House of Parliament.' ”

The Declaration ran as follows:

“I, A. B. do solemnly and sincerely in the presence of God profess, testify and declare that I do believe that in the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper there is not any Transubstantiation of the Elements of Bread and Wine into the Body and Blood of Christ at or after the consecration thereof by any person whatever. And that the Invocation or Adoration of the Virgin Mary, or any other saint, and the sacrifice of the Mass, as they are now used in the Church of Rome, are superstitious and idolatrous. And I do solemnly, in the presence of God, testify and declare that I do make this Declaration and every part thereof in the plain and ordinary sense of the words read unto me as they are commonly understood by English Protestants, without any evasion, equivocation or Mental Reservation whatever, and without any dispensation already granted to me by the Pope, or any other authority or person whatever, or without any hope of any such dispensation from any person or authority whatever, or without thinking that I am or can be acquitted before God or man, or absolved of this declaration or any part thereof, although the Pope, or any other person or persons, or power whatsoever, should dispense or cancel the same, or declare that it was null and void from the beginning.”

This oath was part of that fearful system of persecution which ground down and crushed out the liberty and energy of our loyal Catholic ancestors. It is too well known to be repeated here how the legislators of the country found by experience in the reign of Elizabeth that actual infliction of death aroused a life-giving enthusiasm among Catholics and a keen sympathy among the beholders of the suffering of the martyrs, even though they shared not their belief, or had in their weakness conformed under pressure to the requirements of the State religion. And therefore these wicked, though wise, counsellors for the most part ceased to make use of the executioner's block and the foul dungeon, or to employ the rack, the thumb-screw or other instruments of torture to turn the misguided papists from the error of their way. They provided instead the penal system of quiet oppression, the £20 fine a lunar month, for non-attendance at the established church, the great reward for information which should lead to the apprehension of a priest, the punishments for hearing mass or receiving the sacraments or for

harboring a priest, and the hundred other well-known means for curtailing the liberty, despoiling the property and endangering the lives of those who were staunch to their Catholic principles. The folly of James II's policy led to the enactment of more stringent laws, and besides the inability of Catholics to hold rank in the army, to follow any liberal profession, still less, to sit in Parliament, Catholics could not, under William of Orange, inherit land, which went to their nearest kin who was a Protestant, and after 1700 they could not purchase landed property. At no time was intolerance more at its height than when Titus Oates, in 1678, fanned evil prejudices into a flame by his infamous perjuries; and it would be incredible how one who was known to be so utterly unprincipled should have been believed on evidence quite uncorroborated, had it not been thought that there was some possibility of the banished James reasserting his claims to the throne with the aid of Louis XIV.

This oath was in force from 1678 till the Bill for Catholic Emancipation was passed in 1829, and had to be taken by all office-holders under the Crown, and by all members of either House of Parliament. By the Act of 1829 all were released from this necessity except the sovereign, the Lords Chancellors of England and Ireland and a few others; and in 1867 all were released save the sovereign. When the oath was taken by Queen Victoria in 1837 a vigorous protest was made by Dr. Lingard, the historian, who spoke of it as owing its origin to the perjuries of an impostor and the delusion of a nation; but as her reign drew on to sixty years and prejudice gradually dissolved before more liberal tendencies, the majority of Englishmen, a new generation, had almost forgotten its existence. It is true that as the Queen grew to a ripe old age, provident men, such as the late Cardinal Vaughan, Archbishop of Westminster, saw what would again in a short time be required. He frequently spoke of it at public gatherings, and three years before the Queen's death, he approached a cabinet minister, only to be met with a stolid determination on the part of the government to take no active part in the matter. But neither he nor Catholic peers realized on the accession of Edward VII in 1901 that it would be

too late to alter it until the chancellor met their demand by the reply that Parliament alone could alter or abolish the Declaration, and the statutory law required (so it was then thought) that the Declaration should be made before any legislation could be made by Parliament in the next reign. Foiled in this attempt, the Cardinal issued a pastoral letter on February 25 ordering a day of general Communion and Exposition of the Blessed Sacrament in reparation. From that time the struggle, though keener at one time than at another, never ceased until the bill was passed for the abolition of anything denunciatory and offensive, and received the Royal Approval by Commission on August 3, 1910.

The story of the struggle, initiated in the House of Peers by Lord Bray, and continued in the years 1901-1905, is admirably told in the recently published *Life of Herbert Vaughan*.²

Briefly: the negative attitude of the Government; the failure of a Joint Commission of both Houses; a select Commission of the House of Lords, consisting of eight Peers, all non-Catholics, who did not consult Catholic wishes. The result of what should have been the mature deliberations of picked men was to omit the offensive words "superstitious" and "idolatrous" and substitute for them "are contrary to the Protestant religion," and to change the long rigmarole, so insulting alike to Pope and King, to the words "unreservedly." Certainly polite and restrained words were used, but better far, surely, was the old formula in all its nakedness, claiming an indulgence because it was born of an age long past, of prejudice, intolerance and hatred, than thus to have a deliberate re-affirmation in the enlightened twentieth century of the anti-Catholic spirit of the seventeenth. There were, too, other objections: was it effective for its purpose? Mr. Snead-Cox tells us how Cardinal Vaughan laughed loud when he read their Lordship's weighty decision, that the sovereign should solemnly and sincerely profess, testify and declare that the Invocation or Adoration of the saints and the Sacrifice of the Mass were contrary to the Protestant religion.

² B. J. G. Snead-Cox, London, 1910.

"Why, Pope Leo," he exclaimed, "would be delighted to make that statement every morning before breakfast." Further, it was undesirable that the sovereign should misrepresent the doctrine of Catholics by speaking of the Adoration of Our Lady and the Saints, or select for public and solemn denial the most sacred truths of the Catholic creed. All their amendments which tinkered with the words, proved unsatisfactory to one or other party within the Established Church, and the whole matter fell through. Lord Salisbury shifted the whole blame of the failure onto the shoulders of the Catholics, and was followed by the London *Times* of the following day, which considered itself voicing the common opinion when it said: "The law of this country excludes Roman Catholics from the succession to the throne, and the royal declaration is the touchstone necessary to determine whether any given candidate is a Roman Catholic or not. The Roman Catholics want to abolish the legal and regular means of deciding whether the natural heir to the throne, is or is not, disqualified, knowing that if they succeeded in this they would go far to render the law nugatory. Since they have not been able to get what they really want, they no longer profess to value what they pretend to want."

Nothing came of further attempts on the part of Catholics in the House of Parliament to introduce legislation. A bill was brought before Parliament in 1905 but was abandoned owing to the general election. Afterwards the fight concerning the Education Question, in which Catholics and the members of the Church of England stood side by side, made it inopportune to bring forward a matter which would introduce controversial bitterness. But Catholics prayed and spoke and wrote until at length on the death of the late King Edward VII it was seen that times were ripe for the change, and in the session of the last Parliament the second reading of a bill which provided for redress was passed by a majority in the House of Commons, and Mr. Asquith, the liberal Prime Minister, was not out of sympathy with his hearers when he said in the debate on the measure that "the time has come to put an end to this Declaration."

In earlier years very forcible opinions had been expressed both at home and in the colonies. Lord Salisbury, though failing to have a positive policy, had described the oath as a "stain upon the Statute book." Mr. Balfour, the then conservative Prime Minister, had declared its language "very unfortunate." Mr. Redmond, with a touch of Celtic humor, had publicly asserted that he and the Irish would oppose the settlement of the Civil lists and a continuance of his Majesty's salary. Mr. Costigan in the Canadian Parliament had said it was useless as the fifth wheel of a coach. Sir Wilfred Laurier, the Premier, had declared that he would give the motion for its abolition his whole-hearted support. The Parliament of Canada, supported by the two millions and a quarter of Catholics in the Dominion, on March, 1901, had passed with an overwhelming vote the following resolution: "That such a Declaration is most offensive to the dearest convictions of all Roman Catholics. That the staunch loyalty of his Majesty's Roman Catholic subjects in Canada, comprising forty-three per cent. of the entire population of the Dominion, and throughout the British possessions, should not be rewarded by their being chosen alone amongst the believers of all creeds, and branded as idolators by the sovereign. That in the opinion of this House, the Declaration referred to in the above Act of Settlement should be amended by eliminating therefrom all expressions which are especially offensive to the religious belief of any subject of the British Crown." From Malta, too, came strong expressions. "England owes to us this tardy act of justice"; from the Mauritius and the lay Catholics of Ceylon, and from British India in which the Catholic people of Mangalore reminded the Government that in 1858 Queen Victoria had assured all of her subjects in India that they should never be "molested or disquieted by reason of their religious faith." And Australia with its millions or more of Catholics urged that, as three-fourths of the Australian contingent then serving in the South African campaign were Catholics, it could not be 'prudent, honorable or wise to repay their heroism and patriotism with wanton insult.' This was, they said, an outrage against common sense, no less than religion, and an

infringement of the religious equality to which they were entitled by the Constitution of the Commonwealth and which they cherished as their birthright. It was also well-known that King George had said at Laval: "The Catholic Church has amply fulfilled its obligation, not only to teach reverence for law and order, but to instill a sentiment of loyalty and devotion into the minds of those to whom it ministers." In 1910, the protests from Canada and Australia were repeated with emphasis, and the offices in Downing Street were bombarded with letters of resolutions from very various quarters, such as that of the Catholic Union of Great Britain and a large meeting of London and Provincial Unitarian ministers, who urged the 'necessity of modifying the Royal Declaration so as not to wound the feelings of our Roman Catholic fellow subjects'; and a similar resolution was forwarded by the Northern Association of Baptist Churches. The Anglican Archbishop of Canterbury wished the oath to denounce nothing at all, and Lord Halifax, representing the High Church party of the Establishment, urged in the *Times* its complete abolition. Violent language, he said, was used against any change, but the same sort of language had been used against the Catholic Emancipation Act of 1829; it passed, and no one was any the worse. Cardinal Logue on May 26, 1910, wrote that the Declaration 'seems to treat the ruler of a great Empire as if he was a slippery trickster, who would endeavor by equivocation or a secret arrangement with the Pope to mislead his subjects and tamper with the sanctity of an oath. The Oath as it stands is far from complimentary to either the King or the Pope.'

The result of all was that the Prime Minister courageously stood up to the convictions he had already frequently expressed, and began the legislation of the new reign by the introduction of a bill for the amendment of the oath. A positive declaration should take the place of the old denunciation of the Sacred Truths held by Catholics. The first formula proposed, by which the sovereign professed himself a member of the Protestant Reformed Church as by law Established in England, was said by many 'to bristle with false theology, bad history and worse taste.' Let that be as it may; the exact wording, provided it

was a positive profession of faith instead of a denunciation, did not concern Catholics. It was a domestic concern to be settled between the nice distinctions of belief into which the all-comprehensive Established Church is divided. The words met with objections from many quarters, by those Anglicans who did not consider the Church of England a 'Protestant body' nor 'by law Established,' and by non-Conformists who thought the words implied a stigma upon themselves and objected to the Church of England being singled out as the Protestant Church. Another amendment, proposing that there should be inserted a repudiation of any claim by any other power which touched the sovereignty of the King, was disposed of amidst laughter by Mr. Healy pointing out that if this amendment was carried 'Defensor Fidei' would have to be removed from the coins of the realm.

At length the Third Reading of the Bill was passed in the House of Commons with a majority of 193, met with little opposition from the Lords and received the royal assent by Commission on August 3. By the "Accession Declaration Act of 1910" future sovereigns will thus make their profession of faith:

"I, A. B., do solemnly and sincerely in the presence of God profess, testify and declare that I am a faithful Protestant; that I will, according to the true intent of the enactments which secure the Protestant Succession to the Throne of my realm, uphold and maintain the said enactments to the best of my power."

Catholics are satisfied. They would, indeed, wish before God like St. Paul, that sovereigns and all their fellow-subjects were "like as I am in little and in great, except these bands." They would wish their sovereign free, as is his lowliest subject, and unshackled by religious tests, but England is still a Protestant country and it is too much to hope that though some future sovereign may have atheistic or agnostic tendencies, he should be a Papist and yet be allowed the sceptre of the Empire.

Looking back, it seems difficult to realize that such a painful reflection on the intelligence of a civilized and enlightened community should have remained law so long, and that any struggle should have been necessary to abrogate it. Such a

declaration was first of all, wholly ineffective. It was, as Mr. Asquith had long ago declared, "one of the flimsiest and most unnecessary safeguards for the Protestant succession"; for the Protestant succession to the throne is secured not by this declaration but by the express provisions of the Bill of Rights, and the Act of Settlement (1700) which, though it invited the line of Hanover, who were foreigners, to England and could neither speak nor understand the English tongue but were ardent Protestants, yet provided 'that every person who is or shall be reconciled, or shall hold communion with the See or Church of Rome, or shall profess the Popish religion or shall marry a Papist, shall be excluded and be forever incapable to inherit, possess or enjoy the crown or government of the realm and Ireland and the dominions thereunto belonging.' Those statutes go on to provide that in every such case the people of these realms are absolved from their allegiance, and the Crown and the government are to pass to the next heirs, as though the offending sovereign were naturally dead. The Act of Settlement further enacts that 'whoever shall come to the possession of the Crown of England shall join in communion with the Church of England as by Law established.' With these drastic Enactments on the Statute book, the oath was surely neither necessary nor effective. But it was sufficient to give pain and offense. In the first place, of the numerous religious doctrines of sects which may be counted by the score, held by subjects of his majesty which he as Supreme Head of the Church of England was bound to disbelieve, certain characteristics and cherished beliefs of the Catholic Church were alone singled out and branded with condemnation. These articles of faith which dealt only with religious mysteries and had no bearing on allegiance or public order, were treated as so odious and so wicked as to deserve and require an exceptional denunciation. Between man and man in private life such treatment would deserve condemnation, how much more in the case of the sovereign, publicly and audibly in the presence of the chief men of the realm, many of whom were loyal Catholics, on the most solemn occasion of his life and reign, when men of all classes were eager to tender to him the homage of their dutiful allegiance.

The coarse and violent language no doubt aggravated the offence, but the substance of the complaint of Catholics was that a state function should be made the occasion of an official condemnation of a religion authorized by law. In the next place, the Declaration falsely ascribed to Catholics tenets which they did not hold and which are peculiarly hateful to our fellow-countrymen. It suggested that equivocation and mental reservation were resorted to more by Catholics than other people; that Catholics believed in some dispensing power that can justify a man perjuring himself. It asserted that invocation of the Saints as used in the Catholic Church was equivalent to divine adoration and therefore idolatrous. All ludicrously untrue. Catholics had indeed a right to demand whether the outrage upon their faith was only the unhappy survival of forgotten quarrels belonging to a time when it might be said that there still lived "Popish Pretenders" to the crown, or stood to-day as representing the deliberate will of our living legislators. Happily the result may be taken, despite the noisy opposition of a small minority, to answer the question on the part of the nation as a whole. Our respected sovereign King George V when he is crowned next June, will not therefore be required to undergo the ordeal, so distasteful to his father, or solemnly denouncing as idolatrous and superstitious the loyal Catholic peers who will stand round to give him their homage, nor those countless numbers of Catholics who throughout the vast possessions of the Empire make up a large percentage of Civil officials or of the army or navy or serve elsewhere as true patriotic subjects.

Yet there are misgivings on the part of non-Catholics. Two special articles in the *London Times* in June, whilst praising the tolerance of the age and recognizing that the popular errors concerning Catholics of 1829 have been belied by succeeding events and that no one doubts the capacity and loyalty of Catholics, yet dwelt much upon the fundamental difference between the Catholic Church and the various religious communities which divide Christendom. The main cause of the Declaration was there asserted to be, not 'an historical puzzle'

as Fr. Bridgett, O. P., had called it, but 'two irreconcilable conceptions of life and the basis of society and the State. Rome represents authority, Protestantism liberty.' That 'It is the Mass that matters' is recognized by many, and these articles asserted that 'Transubstantiation and the Mass were premises on which the medieval schoolmen built up the whole priestcraft.' However offensively expressed, these thoughts contain a good deal of truth when stated in a proper way. Our fellow-countrymen view with serious apprehension the steady and rapid growth of High Churchism within the Establishment, and the constant stream of converts to Catholicism. In 1689 there was no doubt as to the religion of this country, and in 1829 the Church of England was solidly Protestant. Now the most influential in it repudiate this epithet and frequently teach the doctrines denounced in the oath, and many advocate corporate reunion with Rome. No longer can the Catholics of England be scornfully designated 'the Italian mission.' They are seen to be a powerful influence in the land, and the unified system of theological principles taught to the poorest child is a marked contrast to the flux of variable opinions which issue from the non-Catholic pulpit. Some light on the growth of the Church may be gained from the following statistics quoted by Archbishop Bourne at the National Congress in 1910. In 1850 on the re-establishment of the Catholic hierarchy in England the number of priests in England and Wales was 788, now it is 3,687; the number of churches was 587, now it is 1,760; the schools numbered 99 with 11,000 children attending, now they number 1,064 with 330,000 children attending. Many indeed are the evil and irreligious forces at work in the country, but we confidently trust that, in God's own time, the leaven of Catholic principles will restore the glorious traditions of an age long past when England was known as 'The Island of Saints' and 'Mary's dowry.'

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ARISTOTLE AS A PSYCHOLOGIST AND A METAPHYSICIAN.

Two questions of philosophy will always be of profound interest not only to the technical student of the science, but to every thinking person, namely, What is the soul? and How is the real world constituted? The first of these is the problem of psychology; the second is the problem of metaphysics. They have always interested mankind, ever since men began to reflect on their own thoughts. What is the soul? Is it a shadow, or is it a substance, and if it is a substance, is it different in kind from the body or only a more subtle sort of matter; is it a spirit or only a body; is it immortal, or does it too die when death claims the body for its own? And then, when we have answered these questions in one way or another, it is natural to reach out into the wider problem of the universe, its origin, its cause, its nature, and, more especially its constituents in the order of reality. In both these lines of inquiry Aristotle was, if not a pioneer, at least a systematizer and an original investigator to such an extent that he is said to be the founder both of psychology and of metaphysics.

Before Aristotle's time there were, it need hardly be said, men who thought seriously about the soul and its nature. He, however, was the first, so far as we know, to write a special work on the soul, and to organize into a system his views on the subject, so that, while there were, undoubtedly, among his predecessors some who composed treatises on questions of psychology, he was the first to write a book treating of all the problems of the science, and consequently, his work *On the Soul* is the first comprehensive treatise on the subject. There, he surveys the whole ground, reviews the opinions of those who went before him, discusses the nature of the soul in general, of the human soul in particular, and describes in succession the various functions and activities of the soul.

And here, at the very outset of our study, let us remove a possible source of misunderstanding. If I were to speak to you of horses and dogs having souls, some of you, I am sure, would be mildly surprised, or would, perhaps, think that I was an ardent, or somewhat over-zealous, member of the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. If I were to go farther still, and speak of the soul of the rose or the oak tree, you would certainly be convinced that I was using words figuratively, and taking advantage, for the moment, of the license accorded to poets and imaginative writers. And if I were to ask you why you objected to the word soul in the case of animals and plants, you would, no doubt, answer, "Because animals and plants cannot think." In other words, you take for granted that soul and mind are the same, that the soul is the principle of thought, and that where there is no thought, at least where, as in the case of plants, there is no consciousness, there should be no mention of a soul. This is the too wide-spread misunderstanding, which is traceable to Descartes, the sixteenth century philosopher, who is regarded as the founder of modern philosophy. For him, the soul is the principle of thought, and soul and mind are synonymous. For the whole pre-Cartesian world, for the schoolmen, especially, and for Aristotle, their master, the soul has a wider meaning. It is the principle, not only of thought, but of every other vital activity as well. The soul is the principle of life, and since plants and animals have life, it is perfectly correct to speak of plant souls and animal souls. What is peculiar to man is not the possession of a soul, but the possession of a soul that is immaterial and spiritual. Intellectual thought and spiritual aspiration form a barrier between us and the rest of the universe; but life, which we share with all living things, is a bond between us and all other of creatures, or, at least, between us and the greater part of the world of nature around us. A saint, like Saint Francis, loves flowers and animals because they are his sisters and his brothers, being children of Our Common Father; but any man, be he sinner or saint, may feel, if he is sensitive enough, the bond

that binds us in the natural order to all living things. We must, then, adopt this wider idea of the soul if we are to understand what Aristotle has to say on the subject. We must adopt what I may call the biological, as opposed to the psychological, definition of the soul.

This notion, however, was not attained by the human mind at once. The soul-idea ran its course through mythology, popular misconception and imperfect scientific analysis, before Aristotle came and precised it for us in this way. Primitive man explained the activity of our waking moments by imagining that there is something within us which leaves us temporarily during sleep and departs permanently from us at the moment of death. This something the savage called a soul, a shadow, a phantom or a ghost. Through the influence of religious sentiment this notion was developed in several ways. For instance, stress was laid on the superiority of the soul to the body; consciousness of sin was imputed to the soul, though the blame for most sins was usually assigned to the body; life after death was ascribed to the soul, and transmigration, or the return of the soul in other bodies, was taught as a means or retribution for past offences. At this point philosophy took up the task. But not at the beginning of philosophic speculation. The first philosophers of Greece were interested almost exclusively in the origin of the universe, and had no notion of the soul except that which they borrowed from popular belief or from the prevalent religion. Later on, the distinction between the different kinds of knowledge, especially between sense knowledge and intellectual knowledge, forced on the philosophers the consideration of the soul as a something superior to the body and yet somehow related to the body. There were materialists in those days, who, as usual, offered a facile solution that easily satisfied the superficial mind. They said: the soul is but a more refined kind of matter; the particles that compose it are round and smooth; these particles move without friction; hence thought, which is a function of the soul, is more perfect than sense knowledge, which is a function of the body; thought is not superior to sense knowl-

edge in kind, but only in degree. This solution could not commend itself to the more spiritually minded. Anaxagoras, for instance, could not for a moment admit that mind, as he calls it, is material; its activities, he said, show it to be superior to matter. Above all, Plato could not accept the materialistic view. For him, the spiritual is more real than the material; the soul is more necessary to the body than the body to the soul; spirit is not derived from matter, but matter from spirit. And so these spiritualistically minded philosophers conceived the soul to be a substance of a different kind from the body, indwelling in the body "like the sailor in a ship," says Plato, moving the body, being itself self-moved. Aristotle, reviewing these opinions, as he does in the first Book of his treatise *On the Soul*, calls attention at once to their inadequacy. The materialists, he thinks, do less than justice to the soul when they define it as a more subtle kind of matter; they overlook the immaterial activities of the soul, which cannot be explained by material causes. On the other hand, the ultra-spiritualists seem to him to exaggerate the distinction between the body and the soul when they make the soul to be an independent substance indwelling in the body and in contact with it in a merely accidental manner. He, therefore, puts forward his own definition of the soul as the principle of all the vital activities of the body. In this view, the soul is not a material substance; it is not a substance independent of the body; it forms one substance with the body, so that the union of the two is vital, intrinsic and substantial.

It is worth while to spend some effort in trying to realize what this definition means. All psychology sways between the two extremes of materialism and spiritualism of the exaggerated type. There are two terms in the problem: soul and body. Materialism, in effect, does away with one of these terms by reducing the soul to some condition or state of the body or by saying practically that the soul is a part of the body, for instance, the brain or the nervous system. Exaggerated spiritualism does away with the other term by minimising the importance of the body, regarding it ethically as

the prison house of the soul, or metaphysically as an illusion or error of the mind, or as a thought of the soul, or in some other way refining it, so to speak, out of existence: so that, in this view man, the human being, is essentially, the soul, and the body need not be taken into account. Man is a body, and nothing more, says the materialist. Man is a soul, and his body is a regrettable, but somehow persistent, intruder into the problem, says the spiritualist; and the intruder had best be ignored. Between these two extreme views of the problem of body and soul there is a multitude of opinions tending either towards crude materialism at the one end or towards the boldest idealism at the other. No matter where you stand on the question, you stand somewhere between these two points, materialism and ultra-spiritualism. Where, then, does Aristotle stand? He seems to me to stand at the only point, if I may say so, that is equidistant from the absurdity of either extreme. His position is logical and sane. He agrees with common sense; and, so far, I think, all the advance that empirical and experimental psychology have made in our day tends but to confirm his followers in the conviction that he is right. He holds that the body is real and that the soul also is real. At the same time, he maintains that they are in no way separate substances. They are two real principles of the one substance, man. The body is the passive principle, the soul is the active principle of all vital functions. The body does not contain the soul in the same way as the casket contains the jewel or the chemical test tube some highly volatile gas. The body is not transfused or interpenetrated by the soul, in the same way as the air in a room may be permeated by some subtle perfume, or the atmosphere in some day in June may be shot through and through by the rays of the sun. "Containing," "being permeated, transfused or interpenetrated": these are all inadequate to express the union of soul and body; for the union is vital and substantial. If I say that man viewed in one light is body, and viewed in another light, is soul, I have used an expression that is nearer the truth than any other that has been used so far. We commonly say it is the soul that

thinks, it is the body that walks. Aristotle would say the soul is the active and the body, in a sense, the passive principle of thought; and he would say with equal accuracy the soul is the active and the body is the passive principle of locomotion. The unreflecting mind, the popular mind, always falls into the habit of assigning some of our activities to the soul and others to the body. To the soul we assign what is immaterial, spiritual and aesthetic; it is the soul that sees beauty in a picture or a landscape. It is the body, we say, that moves from place to place, that digests food and transforms vital energy into muscular action when we work. But Aristotle would assign all these activities to both body and soul. In reality, it is the individual human being who does any of these things; in each case the body is the passive principle and the soul is the active principle. The same is true of our ascription of qualities. Piety, patriotism, charity, justice are said to be qualities of the soul. Health, strength of muscle, complexion of body are said to be physical qualities. But, the Aristotelian would say, these, too are qualities of soul; for, in so far as they are vital, the soul has a share in them.

If, now, we investigate the phenomena of life in plants, animals and human beings, we shall find that there are different kinds of vital functions. In plants the whole cycle is completed in the processes of nutrition, growth and reproduction. In animals, at least, in the higher animals, there are added locomotion and sensation. In man there is added still another class, the processes included under the general title "rational thought." The human soul, therefore, differs from the souls of lower animals and of plants by the fact that it is the principle of thought as well as the principle of all the lower functions. And this brings us to the consideration of intellect, mind or reason, as we call it, which is not a part of the soul, but a function, or rather a faculty, or power, of the human soul. The study of the intellectual powers of the soul leads, naturally, to a discussion of knowledge, which I hope, will throw further light on the nature of the soul and its relation

It is a principle of method with Aristotle that "In every department of nature we must first ascertain the facts and, after that, state the causes." Now, the first facts in relation to knowledge are these. All our knowledge begins with sense-knowledge. The intellect has no innate ideas: we do not come into this life "trailing clouds of glory," except in the sense that we bring with us a God-given and God-like power of acquiring ideas. At the beginning, the mind, says Aristotle, is like a blank page on which nothing is written. The page is perfectly blank: it is not even a palimpsest on which are characters at first indiscernible, to be later brought to light by a power of recollection. That was Plato's doctrine. Aristotle holds that all our knowledge is acquired, acquired through the senses. The senses are the doors and windows of the soul. Only through them can knowledge come to us. A man who is born blind can acquire knowledge by means of his other senses, wisdom being, in Milton's pathetic phrase, "from one entrance quite shut out." But, if a man had no senses at all, if he were deprived of hearing, smell, taste and touch, as well as of sight, he should, if he could live at all, be compelled to pass his life without any knowledge of anything. The mind cannot evolve a single idea out of itself, without working on the materials supplied by the senses. "There is nothing in the Intellect," say the Aristotelians, "that was not first in the senses." The first series of facts, then, that we observe in regard to the intellect leads to the conclusion that it depends essentially on the senses. If, now, we turn to examine and compare the kind of knowledge that we get through the senses alone, and that which the intellect elaborates from sense-knowledge, we shall find that, while the intellect depends on the senses, intellectual knowledge is generically different from, and superior to, sense-knowledge. Through the senses we get impressions, as of color, of sound, of sweetness, etc. By means of the senses we combine, or rather unite, these impressions into what we nowadays called percepts; such, for instance, is my percept of the table here before me, made up from impressions of color, shape, hardness, etc. We are still within the region

of sense. At this point, intellect takes up the work, and from the data of the senses, that is from impressions and percepts, it extracts, or abstracts, general ideas or concepts. It is clear, says Aristotle, that while a percept and a concept may represent the same thing, they represent it differently. The percept is a sense-image, representing only material things, and representing them in a singular and contingent manner; it represents *this* table, *that* chair, the red book before me on my desk. The concept, or idea is an intellectual image; it may represent an immaterial thing such as justice, and it always represents universally for instance, *a* chair, *a* table, *a* book. Moreover, the content of a percept is contingent: the table that is round may be made square, the chair that is standing on its feet may be tilted, the red book may be rebound in black, and the percept will have to change its content if it is to remain true. But the content of an idea is necessary. A triangle is always a figure of three sides, nothing more, nothing less. A chair is an article of furniture of a certain kind; its definition does not change, and the idea represents the definition. It is evident, then, that an intellectual image, which we call an idea, is different in kind from a sense-image which is a mere impression, or percept. The idea is universal and necessary; the sense image is particular and contingent. Therefore, Aristotle concludes, intellectual knowledge is superior to sense-knowledge. In these two words, then, *dependence* and *superiority*, we may sum up his doctrine on this point. By teaching that intellect is superior to sense, he avoids the doctrine of sensism; by holding that intellect depends on the senses, he avoids the other extreme, innatism. Sensism is only materialism applied to psychology, and innatism is merely an inference from the ultra-spiritualistic doctrine of the soul. Here, then, we have the same problem over again that we had when dealing with the relation between soul and body, and here, as in the other case, Aristotle avoids the inconvenience of both extreme doctrines by striving to hold a middle course between them.

Since the intellect, in the acquisition of ideas, attains the

necessary and the universal, it must be immaterial. Here, however, we are face to face with the greatest problem of interpretation that is to be met with in the study of Aristotle. We cannot avoid discussing it, because it had momentous consequences in the subsequent career of Aristotelianism, and because, even at the present day, it divides the interpreters of Aristotle into two opposing camps. The intellect in the act of extracting ideas from the data of sense—let us once for all designate it as the Active Intellect—must, we have said, be immaterial. But where and what, is this power which creates (in the large sense of the word) the material of our higher mental life? Is it a faculty of the individual soul, like memory, or imagination, or the sense of sight, or the power of judging or reasoning? Or is it something outside the individual, common to all men, coming into contact with the individual soul for a moment and then deserting it until there is once more occasion for its intervention? Or is it God Himself, or some Divine Influence that thus dominates our intellectual life? It may be admitted at once that all these interpretations have been held, that some of them are still held, and that there are passages in the work *On the Soul* which apparently justify, now one, now another, interpretation. The great Arabian commentators, of whom we shall have more to say, later, held that the Active Intellect is one for all men and separate from the individual soul. Hence, they inferred, the individual soul is not necessarily immortal; at least, it cannot be proved to be immortal, because the only title it could have to immortality, its power to create universal ideas, does not really belong to it at all. On the contrary, all the schoolmen held that the Active Intellect is to be understood as a faculty of the individual soul; they held this to be the meaning of Aristotle's words and they repudiated the Arabian interpretation, not only because it jeopardized individual immortality, but because it seemed to them to misrepresent Aristotle. The study of the text does not help us much; for, unfortunately, the text is corrupt or doubtful just where we should expect to find it most decisive. This much, however, is clear, the inter-

pretation of the schoolmen is more in harmony with the general spirit of Aristotelianism. There was nothing of the mystic in Aristotle. Whatever mysticism was later associated with his philosophy is due to the commentators, who interpreted to suit their own mystic tendency the very passages we are just now considering. The question is mentioned at this point chiefly because the doctrines already described lead up to it. In the paper on Aristotle and the Medieval Church it will come up again for discussion.

We are now prepared to consider the question did Aristotle teach that the soul is immortal? Yes and No. If the Active Intellect is part of the individual soul, or rather a power or faculty of it, since it is immaterial, it and, therefore, the soul to which it belongs, must be immortal. If, on the other hand, the Active Intellect is something outside us and above us, holding communion with us from time to time, but not indwelling in us, there is nothing in the individual soul to entitle it to exemption from death. On this most important point, one of the most momentous is the whole range of philosophical inquiry, Aristotle must be judged far inferior to Plato. Socrates was personally convinced of the soul's immortality, but so far as we know, he left us no formal proof of it. Plato was equally convinced that the rational part of the soul is immortal, and he left us a series of proofs which, if they are not rigorously valid, at least contribute by their eloquence, their earnestness, and their sublime beauty, to increase our conviction that we are immortal. Aristotle, no doubt, believed as firmly as Socrates and Plato; we may even go so far as to say that his proof of the immortality of the Active Intellect is more cogent than all Plato's arguments. Yet, owing to the obscurity of the passages in which he sets forth his doctrine, it was possible, as we shall see later, for commentators to maintain that he denied the soul's immortality. Even the great scholastic admirers of Aristotle found him unsatisfactory on this point.

Before passing on to the study of Aristotle's great work on *Metaphysics*, it will, I think, be profitable for us to pause here a moment and take up a question which is partly psychol-

ogical and partly metaphysical, the question of the value of knowledge, which, as some of you, no doubt are aware, is *the* problem of philosophy at the present moment. Those of us who have not studied philosophy have, I dare say, never raised the question at all, even in our own minds. We have taken for granted that our thoughts represent things as they really are in a world outside us and independent of us. That is the view of common sense. But a philosopher, if he cared to upset our faith in the verdict of common sense could easily do so. He would begin by calling our attention to what he considers an evident fact of observation, namely, that our sense impressions have in them no reference to anything outside our own mind. We see whiteness; but whiteness is a sensation, and does not exist except in our senses. We taste sweetness; but sweetness exists only in the organ of taste. And so on. The piece of sugar that we imagine to exist on the table before us reduces itself to a sensation of whiteness, a sensation of sweetness, etc., all of which exist only in our own consciousness. The piece of sugar, therefore, exists only in our mind. It is, in this analysis, a thought, not a thing at all. Similarly, everything else in the so-called external world is only a thought; there are, strictly speaking no things, no reality outside the mind. Nothing exists except thoughts, or ideas—this is the doctrine of idealism in philosophy. And it is not, as some may, perhaps, think, a puzzle to test beginners in philosophy, a kind of *pons asinorum*, or a trick of logic like that by which a person will undertake to prove to us that every cat has ten tails. It is a serious question, discussed quite seriously by learned professors of philosophy; and the conclusion is gravely and, I may add, courageously, admitted, that in spite of common sense, the so-called external world does not really exist. Every reader of J. M. Barrie has enjoyed the passage in *An Edinburgh Eleven*, where he describes the effect that was produced on him by the lectures of Alexander Campbell Fraser; how he returned to his lodgings mystified and perplexed, and for hours sat with bent head meditating on the possibly negative answer to the question “Do I exist, *properly so called?*” The

question of philosophy today is: Does anything *exist properly so called*; is it not all an illusion, or at least, "such stuff as dreams are made of?" Common sense says that things do exist, properly so called; this table exists, you exist, I exist, the statue of Liberty in New York harbor exists. At one time, it is true, that statue was only a thought in the mind of the artist, Bartholdi. But, says common sense, it exists now as a reality, and if you doubt it, go down and see it, draw close to it, touch it and realize that it exists. Yes, says the idealist philosopher—who is in many seats of learning at the present day—yes, you think it exists, because you have certain impressions of color, and muscular sensations and sensations of touch. But these, when you analyse them, are only states of consciousness. Therefore all you are warranted in saying is "I have a complex state of consciousness which I call the Statue of Liberty." On such questions Aristotle is on the side of common sense. The question was up for discussion in a different form in his day, but in a form essentially the same as that of the present day problem. It all turns on a simple fact of observation. As often happens in philosophy, an apparently trivial difference at an early stage of the argument leads to tremendously different consequences later on. We are told that down in Mississippi, when the river is at danger point, the enemy of some planter, wishing to ruin a whole plantation, will steal to the levee at night and try to cause it to collapse. Sometimes, they say, where the levee is already weakened by the action of the current, an opening made with the point of a fishing pole is sufficient to let in a tiny thread of water, which, working gradually larger, will soon cause the levee to collapse and end by inundating the country for hundreds of miles. Something like that happens occasionally in philosophy. Common sense says the world outside us exists independently of our thoughts; idealism says that all that vast world, the sun, the moon, the stars, the earth with its mountains and oceans and rivers and streams, its forests and deserts, its busy, thriving cities, its farreaching stretches of prosperous farmland, its millions of plants and animals and

mén—that all this exists only in our minds. The tiny aperture that admits this flood of differences is, as I said, a matter apparently easy to decide. The idealist says what I perceive is whiteness or sweetness or some other sensation. The common sense philosopher says No, what I perceive is a something-white-distinct-from-myself, a something-sweet-distinct-from-myself. In other words, common sense philosophy says that the distinction between self and not-self, between thoughts and things is not of our own making, but is forced upon us by our experience in the very simplest processes of knowledge. And so the whole question is thrown back on observation. We have to try and catch ourselves in the act of knowing, and observe what takes place. I do not think that practical people, if left to themselves, will be seriously disturbed by the thought that, possibly, the external world does not exist. If, however, one reads even an essay on philosophy nowadays, one cannot help learning that there is such a problem, and I should feel that justice had not been done to Aristotle if we had failed to register his verdict on the side of common sense.

The same saneness, if I may so call it, which saved Aristotle from running counter to common sense in his theory of knowledge, characterises what he has to say in his *Metaphysics* about the constitution of reality. Someone, indeed, has defined metaphysics as organized common sense; someone else has said that it is an unusually obstinate effort to think accurately. And if the science so described is the bugbear of many, it is largely because of the vagaries of the idealists about whom we have just been talking. In this paper we cannot hope to do more than give a general notion of what Aristotle means by metaphysics and describe very briefly some of his most important metaphysical doctrines. The word metaphysics needs to be defined. There is hardly another word in the English language that is so often misused. Any philosophy that is abstruse or unintelligible is sure to be labelled metaphysics. It was, I suppose, in reference to some such philosophy that metaphysics was defined “Looking in a dark room for a black hat that isn’t there.” Then we have “metaphysical healing,” and

it is not at all uncommon to see at a country fair a gaudily painted canvas announcing that "Madame So-and-So, *Professor of Metaphysics*, will read one's fortune and foretell one's future: one palm fifty cents, both palms one dollar." It is, indeed, necessary to define metaphysics, and I believe we can have no better instructor in this matter than Aristotle, who founded the science.

Aristotle defines science in general as knowledge of things in their causes. The difference between scientific knowledge and knowledge that is not scientific is not a difference in accuracy, nor a difference in usefulness. Knowledge that is not scientific may be accurate; it may also be useful: it may even be more accurate and more useful than scientific knowledge. The trapper or the hunter or the loafer who happens to have one pursuit and that the gentle art of angling, may know a country district perfectly. He may know its every nook and corner, he may know where every rock and stream and hill is located, he may know the height and depth of each; he may know where the wood is thickest, what kind of trees grow there, and what kind of grass; but he cannot tell *why* the rock is there, *why* the hill is such a height, *why* pines grow in one place and oaks in another, *why* the bank is mossy, and the river bed filled with shining pebbles. The professor of geology and botany in the neighboring high school knows the same district, and he can give a reason, or assign the cause for all the facts which the other cannot explain. The hunter or fisherman has knowledge which is not scientific, but it is none the less accurate and useful. Indeed, if a body of troops were to be led through the district, I have no doubt the commander would rather have the hunter than the professor as a guide. Scientific knowledge, then, is knowledge which assigns a reason or cause. If I know that the rails of a street car track are longer in summer than in winter, I know a fact. If I knew that the difference in length is due to heat, I assign a cause, and my knowledge begins to be scientific.

Starting, then with this general notion of science, Aristotle proceeds towards his definition of metaphysics in the follow-

ing manner. All sciences seek causes. The physicist is interested only in those things which possess color, heat or other form of motion; and the causes which he seeks belong to that order of reality. The mathematician does not care whether the object of his study has physical qualities or not: color does not interest him, nor heat, nor any other mode of motion: he is interested in things that have quantity, and the causes which he assigns belong to the order of quantity. The metaphysician is directly interested, neither in physical qualities nor in quantity; he studies even such things as God and the human soul, which have neither quantity nor color. He is interested in reality; and the causes which he assigns are of the order of reality in general, transcending both the physical and the mathematical. If we consider the scope of the metaphysician's inquiry, we shall find that he is interested in everything. He claims the whole world of reality for his domain. The physicist must confine himself to his own realm; with the immaterial and the spiritual he has nothing to do, as a scientist. The mathematician must restrict his enquiry and his conclusions to the realm of things possessing quantity; the immaterial and spiritual are outside his province too. The metaphysician knows no such restrictions. He roams up and down the universe, physical, mathematical and spiritual; so long as a thing is real in any order whatever, it belongs to his science. But, it does not follow from this that metaphysics is merely an encyclopedic summary of the other sciences; it does not follow that the metaphysician is the man who carries in his one intellect all the knowledge that the other scientists acquire. His point of view is different. Like the traveller who, at the highest point of the mountain range, gains a wider view, but at the same time a unitary view, including all that can be seen from each of the lower peaks, so the metaphysician looks out on all reality and sees that portion of it which the physicist sees or the mathematician sees, but he sees it from a higher point. Metaphysics, then is the most universal of the sciences, because it comprehends all reality in its survey. It is the highest in its point of view, because it seeks, not the

proximate causes, as the others do, but the highest and most general causes; thus it culminates, as Aristotle remarked, in the consideration of God the First and most Universal of all causes.

To admit this definition of metaphysics was, to Aristotle's way of thinking, to admit that metaphysics is the most important of all the sciences. Indeed, he puts forward the explicit claim that metaphysics is the hegemonic, or ruling, science. It is, he says, at the foundation of all the other sciences, and is at the same time, the culmination of them all. The comparison is, perhaps, a bit bewildering. How can metaphysics be at once the foundation and the coping-stone of the edifice of knowledge? Let us vary the metaphor, and we shall be nearer the truth, perhaps, if we regard metaphysics as a territory surrounding, and including the territories of all the other sciences. Any path which we take in physics, biology, chemistry, or mathematics, whichever way we follow it, will lead back to metaphysics or forward to metaphysics, unless indeed, we meet, as we often do in scientific works, a sign "Danger! this road leads to metaphysics!" The presuppositions of physics are justified in metaphysics, and every physical problem, if pursued far enough, leads us to the consideration of the ultimate nature of matter, motion, force, etc., which is a metaphysical problem. To Aristotle it seemed utterly absurd that anyone should try to dispense with metaphysics in a scheme of scientific knowledge. Truth, he said, is one; the mind of the learner is one; therefore there ought to be in a scheme of knowledge one science which would give unity, cohesiveness and articulation to the whole body of facts, laws and principles acquired by science. Aristotle, it seems to me, was right. From the point of view of education, his contention is correct that there must be a unifying, co-ordinating and organizing science, if the other sciences are to be saved from one-sided progress, unbalanced development and specialization to the point of fragmentation. The sciences, as we call them, need metaphysics as much as metaphysics needs them. For the truly cultured mind, metaphysics is a necessity. It is

needed if there is to be order and not chaos in the contents of the mind. The demand for it is natural, and to forbid the study of metaphysics as unscientific is to set up a "No Trespass" sign in a thoroughfare where all have a perfect right to travel. Metaphysics has lent the shelter of its name to many of the aberrations of the human mind: that, however, is no reason why it should be deprived of its legitimate rights.

Passing over now, the whole body of metaphysical doctrine, in which Aristotle analysed our notions of Being, Substance, Quantity, and so forth, we come to the doctrine in which, according to him, all metaphysical speculation culminates—the doctrine regarding the existence and nature of God. Socrates had already introduced the argument from design. He had formulated the principle that "Whatever exists for a useful purpose must be the work of intelligence," and had referred in a general way to the evidences of useful purpose found in nature. Aristotle, with his wider knowledge of natural science and his keener insight into the meaning of natural phenomena, supplied additional evidence of purposiveness, and added strength to the argument from that side. He did more, however; he added a new argument furnished by his analysis of the nature of motion. Motion, he says, ordinarily implies a mover and a thing moved. If my hand moves a cane and the cane moves a stone that lies in my path, the cane is a mover, the stone is the thing moved, and again my hand is a mover and the cane is the thing moved. Here we have a series, the stone, the cane, the hand. In such a series, says Aristotle, we must, if we go back far enough, come to the first in the series which, while it moves the next in the series, and so moves all the others, is itself unmoved. All nature is such a series. Therefore, there must be somewhere the First Mover, Itself Unmoved. In the work on *Physics*, where this question is discussed, Aristotle appears to identify the First Mover with the First Heaven. His meaning is that each of the heavenly bodies, the earth, the moon, the planets, the sun, is moved by the heavenly sphere above it, until we come to the last of the visible spheres, the sphere of the fixed stars. That, too, is moved

by what is above it, namely, the First Heaven; but in a very curious way. A planet, let us say, is moved by the sun, in as much as the sun gives it a kind of physical impulse, pushing it, or driving it along its course—Aristotle has no inkling of movement by physical attraction. But when we come to the First Heaven, *that* moves, not by imparting an impulse, but by attracting (in a metaphorical sense) the next sphere towards it. The First Heaven is beautiful, it is good, it is desirable; and the sphere next beneath it is endowed with intelligence. Just as the noble-minded man is drawn towards a friend in whom he sees nobility of character and moral grandeur, just as the mind is drawn towards lofty ideals, so the lower sphere turns to the First Heaven, observes its desirability, and is drawn towards it in admiration and love. This is the love, of which Dante speaks,

“Which moves the sun and all the other stars.”

A curious idea this, according to modern notions, yet full of poetic possibilities. There is a survival of it in Milton's way of speaking about the heavenly bodies.

The notion that God, the First Cause, is the First Heaven in the physical order is superseded in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* by the doctrine that the First Cause is Intelligence. The life of God is thought. He dwells in endless contemplation. Everywhere Aristotle places theory above practice, and so here he places contemplation above action. Supreme reality is thought. The highest perfection of all is the eternal thought in which the life of God consists. If, now, you ask What is the object of God's thought? Aristotle answers: God Himself. He is the Thought of Thought, the Intelligence of Intelligence. Like some powerful Oriental monarch, he shuts himself up in the majesty and splendor of His Own Thought, and it would degrade Him unutterably to mingle with mundane affairs or even to have anything inferior to Himself occupy His thought for an instant. The shortcomings of this idea of God strike us at once. To our Christian way of thinking, God is Love and Life, as well as Thought. He thinks of us and loves us.

And not only does He think of us and love us; but He thinks of and loves the lowliest of His creatures. To our way of thinking, God's greatness is not diminished, but enhanced by the doctrine of Providence, His glory is not dimmed, but shines out more resplendently in the care and thought with which He envelopes, as with a mantle, the whole universe of his creatures. The denial of Providence, and the exclusion of volition and love from the idea of God—these are the greatest blemishes in Aristotle's treatment of this important metaphysical question.

These defects were not corrected, but were rather emphasized by those who, during the last centuries of the pre-Christian era and the first few hundred years after Christ, undertook to expound the metaphysics of Aristotle. The aloofness of God from the world; the notion that it would degrade Him to think about, and much more so, to interfere with, the trivial things that make up our lives here below; the belief that matter is somehow opposed to God, and the source of all moral evil as well as of physical pain and suffering—these are the fundamental tenets of the Neo-Platonists, as they are called, into whose hands the teaching of Aristotle passed, and by whom it was expounded during all those centuries. We shall see in a later study how these influences perverted the genuine meaning of Aristotle's metaphysics, so that the Aristotle who came into contact with medieval Christianity in the thirteenth century of our era was very different from the Aristotle who placed the doctrine concerning God as the coping-stone to his philosophical edifice towards the end of the fourth century before Christ.

WILLIAM TURNER.

THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF MONASTICISM.

A peculiar feature in the writings of many of those who at the present time pride themselves on originality of ideas and progress in thought is the frequent appeal to history for substantiation of their views. The new receives its value from being old. Even historic civilizations are condemned at times as being at variance with the customs of prehistoric man. Thus while the more radical advocates of a social upheaval are careful to place religion, and especially the Catholic religion, among the institutions which will suffer extinction in the proposed revolution, we find them at times appealing to some forms of social organisation which came into being under Christian influences as models for a new social scheme. Socialists of the Marxian school find no place for religion in their philosophy of the future. They eliminate the supernatural and with it of course all forms of worship and devotion. Nevertheless they do not hesitate to assert that Christianity is socialistic in origin and essence, and they save themselves from the apparent incongruity of testing the validity of their claims by something they wish to reject, through the general principle that all the great factors in life originate in and are conditioned by economic causes. The more moderate socialists, who find nothing incompatible between their theories and a belief in religion, attempt to strengthen their cause by asserting that the tenets they represent exhibit fully the spirit of the gospel and its interpretation in the lives of the first followers of Christ and the teachings of the early Church.¹ Condemnation of usury and avarice, the praise of poverty and denunciation of

¹ Nitti, "Catholic Socialism," Eng. Trans., p. 64. "We are bound to admit that Christianity was a vast economic revolution more than anything else. The first Christians did not seek to acquire wealth; like Christ they sought to annihilate it. Like their Great Master, they had no conception of civil government; the religious idea so dominated them as to destroy all differences of nationality or social condition."

riches, wherever they are found, are taken to mean that the early Christian teachers were opposed on principle to the doctrine of private property. Monasticism in particular is triumphantly stated to be an obvious expression of the inherent opposition of Christianity to a capitalistic régime and a convincing proof that in essence the gospel is communistic.

As a general rule non-Catholic writers exhibit very little sympathy or appreciation for the monastic movement. If they do not entirely reject Christianity they show their disapproval of monasticism by tracing its origin to sources other than the gospel. Hatch finds that the tendency to monasticism came mainly from the Greek philosophical schools. "It was indeed," he says, "known as philosophy. It was most akin to Cynicism, with which it had sometimes already been confused, and its badges were the badges of Cynicism, the rough blanket and the unshorn hair. To wear the blanket and let the hair grow was to profess divine philosophy, the higher life of self-discipline and sanctity."² Others consider Monasticism to be the result of "the universal predominance of the Manichean doctrine of the inherent evil of matter"³ or find its source in Buddhism⁴ in the worship of the Egyptian deity Serapis,⁵ in the teachings of the Neo-Platonists⁶ or set it down as being a revolt against the secularisation of the Church, which led the ascetically-minded to fly "not from the world, but from the world within the Church."⁷ It has remained, however, for the socialists to exalt primitive monasticism as a protest against Capitalism and to have taken it bodily into the socialist camp, not only as a precious memorial left by the early Church of an effort to realize the blessings of a communistic dispensation, but as a standing proof of the feasibility of collectivist administration.

² "The Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages upon the Christian Church," *Hibbert Lectures*, 1888, p. 166.

³ Milman, *The History of Christianity*, Bk. III, chap. XI.

⁴ Hilgenfeld, *Zeitschrift f. wissenschaftl. Theologie*, 1878, p. 148.

⁵ Weingarten, "Der Ursprung des Mönchtums im nachconstantinischen Zeitalter," *Zeitsch. f. Kirchengeschichte*, 1877. Art. "Mönchtum" in the *Realencyclopädie f. protest. Theologie und Kirche*.

⁶ Keim, *Aus dem Urchristentum*, p. 215 seq.

⁷ Harnack, *Monasticism, Its Ideals and Its History*, Eng. Trans., p. 22.

It is a poor philosophy which will not cover all the facts and phenomena in its field. The place of Monasticism in the general scheme of human events as defined by the upholders of the economic philosophy of history has been most lucidly and most fully set forth by Kautsky, whose views may be taken as the latest if not the final judgment of his school,⁸ and for whom apparently historic reality has no significance.

Assuming in accordance with the general principles of the Marxian Philosophy of History that the Christian religion had an economic basis, Kautsky asserts that in essence it is communistic, that it originated as a movement for social reform among the slaves and the proletariat, that it gradually abandoned its communistic character, and, through the patronage of the Emperors, attained power as a state church, becoming in the process the support of the capitalistic class. Its triumph was not a victory for the proletariat, but for the grasping and exploiting clergy: it acquired influence not as a reform power, but as a conservative force, as a new prop for exploitation and oppression. It ceased to be a foe to the poverty of the masses and the increasing wealth of the few and turned from its original purpose to become the mainstay of what it arose to destroy.⁹

This transformation, it is asserted, was not accomplished without protest and opposition. The social conditions which had produced the early Christian democratic communism, continued unabated and even became more oppressive as the Empire weakened and declined. In the Church the abandonment of social reform and the alliance with the state produced a reaction. New democratic and communistic sects sprang into existence, as for example the Circumcellions who in the time of Constantine gave force and point to the struggle against the State and the State-Church by organizing themselves into robber-bands to make war on wealth and class. They even fought against the imperial troops, but the soldiers and the Catholic clergy crushed the rebellion.

⁸ *Der Ursprung des Christentums*. Stuttgart, 1910, p. 481 seq.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 441 seq., 496. This is a summary not a translation of Kautsky's opinions.

Christianity was the State-Church,—the tool of Despotism and Exploitation. It possessed enormous power and resources, and it might well seem that all aspirations for communism had been stifled. That such a result was not attained was due to the fact that the Church, up to the time of its recognition by the state, was confined to the great cities. Only in them could it maintain itself in the period of persecution. When opposition ceased nothing stood in the way of its spread to the country districts, and in these new centres of life the old communistic spirit revived. Precisely at the period when Christianity was tolerated by the rulers of the Empire, monasteries commenced to flourish in Egypt and spread thence to other parts of the Empire. In this way Christianity manifested its natural tendency, and gave proof of the pressing need for social regeneration along communistic lines. Neither the civil nor the ecclesiastical rulers opposed this development. To them it was a distinct gain if the communistic agitators transferred themselves and their doctrines from the cities to the desert, where they were allowed to grow their cabbages in peace.

These communistic settlements were animated by religious enthusiasm: but the real cause of their success is traceable to the economic conditions of the times. Thus through monasticism, the communistic spirit of Christianity received new life and vigor in a form and direction that had no semblance of heretical opposition to the ruling ecclesiastical bureaucracy. The very aloofness and distinction of these new communities were their undoing. The monks became an aristocracy apart from and above the rest of society, which in course of time they ruled and exploited.¹⁰

This summary of the opinions of one of the leading representatives of philosophic socialism, the editor of the "Neue Zeit" regarding the character and origin of monasticism, is all the more interesting as it places a follower of Marx in the curious and paradoxical position of defending a movement that was essentially ascetical, and accepting primitive Monasticism not only as the true expression of Christian life, but as a form

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 481 seq.

of social organisation which resulted directly from economic causes. A favorable verdict from such a quarter is undoubtedly very flattering to the memory of the founders of the early monastic communities: but in view of the determinism of Marxian economists and the rigor of economic laws, it may seriously be doubted whether the propaganda of the "Neue Zeit" will be successful unless its editor can offer as the fruit of communism something more attractive to the natural man than the fasts and rags of the early monks.

The assumptions and assertions in Kautsky's estimate of the origin and nature of Christian monasticism may be reduced to three: 1st. that monasticism came into existence as a direct result of the peace between the Church and state in the beginning of the fourth century, or, in other words, of the *entente cordiale* between the ecclesiastical bureaucracy and the ruling capitalistic class; 2nd. that monasticism was an economic movement; 3rd. that it was collectivist in nature and purpose. It is one of the faults of the defenders of the materialistic interpretation of history that they do not seek for their philosophy in facts and phenomena. In the present case the cause of communism cannot derive much advantage from the growth of the monastic movement, for it can be shown: 1st. that in essence monasticism was thoroughly independent of local or political conditions and that its rise in the Christian Church contemporaneously with the cessation of persecution was largely a mere coincidence; 2nd. the reasons leading to its development show no influence of economic causes, nor of any desire on the part of its founders for social changes; 3rd. in essence and origin it was individualistic and only through a gradual evolution did it attain a collectivist character.

In regard to the first assertion, namely that the monastic movement at the beginning of the fourth century resulted from the change in the legal status of the Christians, there are two points that deserve consideration. Kautsky lays great stress on the fact that Christianity during the period of persecution was confined to the towns and cities.¹¹ It is true that in the begin-

¹¹ "Bis zu ihren staatlichen Anerkennung war die verbreitung des Christ-

ning, from causes directly connected with the exigencies of mission preaching and the persistence of superstition in small and remote communities, the gospel found a readier acceptance in the great centres of population than in remote localities; but long before the time of the edict of Milan it had penetrated to the country districts in most parts of the Empire. In his summary of the results of the missionary activity of the Christians in the first three centuries Harnack expresses the conclusion that: "Christianity had already pushed far into the country districts throughout a large number of the provinces, as we know definitely with regard to the majority of the provinces in Asia Minor, no less than as regards Armenia, Syria, Egypt, Palestine and Northern Africa (with its country towns). Wherever we possess sources bearing on the inner history of the churches in a given province, we light upon a series of small places, otherwise unknown, with Christian inhabitants, or villages which either contain Christians or are themselves entirely Christian. . . . All this shows how deeply Christianity had penetrated the country districts in a number of provinces during the course of the third century, while at the same time it warns us to multiply considerably, the number of such places as we happen to know of, if we want to get any idea of the extent to which Christianity had diffused itself locally."¹²

If primitive Christianity was a socialistic reform movement, which required only a free field for the manifestation of its true nature, it seems strange that there is no trace of communism in the Church of Bithynia-Pontus in the second century, when the faithful were still unspoiled by contact with wealth and power, and when, on the testimony of the imperial governor of the province, the gospel had found a footing in the lowlands and among all classes in the population.¹³ During the third century especially, had the need for legal authorisation

lichen Gemeindelebens im wesentlichen auf die grossen Städte beschränkt gewesen. Nur dort konnte es sich in den Zeiten der Verfolgungen behaupten." *Ibid.*, p. 483.

¹² *Mission and Expansion of Christianity in the First Three Centuries*. Eng. Trans., vol. II, p. 327.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 187.

been necessary for the organization of monastic settlements there is no reason for thinking that such would not have been forthcoming. The Church enjoyed long periods of unbroken peace. The Emperor Alexander Severus admitted its right to possess property,¹⁴ and even though the churches and cemeteries were afterwards expropriated by Valerian, a later ruler, Aurelian in the famous case of Paul of Samosata,¹⁵ laid down a principle under which the monks might have remained in undisturbed possession of their huts or monasteries, if communistic cravings had drawn any of them together.

A second feature of Kautsky's estimate of the rise of monasticism is that he looks on it as a somewhat isolated phenomenon, a movement held in abeyance by the "world in the Church," which awoke to new life under the magic of state toleration by which it was permitted to revive and recuperate in country places.¹⁶ How far this is from being correct will be clear from a consideration of the nature and antecedents of primitive monasticism.

Monasticism has been defined as Social Asceticism. In its peculiarly Christian form it is distinguished by the observance of the three practices of Poverty, Chastity and Obedience. Poverty means renunciation of private property: Chastity including cloistral solitude and celibacy, abstinence from worldly intercourse; and Obedience the surrender of will to a superior.¹⁷ Hence Monasticism and Asceticism are inseparable and as a consequence the origin of Monasticism is to be found in the ascetical movement of which it is the culmination. All the forms of ascetical activity may be found in the monastic life. They differ from the latter only in as far as the initiative of

¹⁴ Lampridius, *Vita Severi*, c. 49.

¹⁵ Eusebius, *His. Eccles.*, Bk. vii, chap. 30.

¹⁶ "Dieser erwachte sofort wieder zu neuem Leben in christlicher Form, sobald die Möglichkeit offenen kommunistischer Organisation auf dem flachen Lande gegeben war. Ein Zeichen, welches starkem Bedürfnis entsprach. Genau um dieselbe Zeit, in der das Christentum staatlich anerkannt wird, im Anfang des vierten Jahrhunderts, entstehen die ersten Klöster in Ägypten, daneben bald andere in den verschiedensten Teilen des Reiches folgen." P. 484.

¹⁷ Zöckler, *Askese und Mönchtum*, p. 9 seq.

the individual ascetic is made subject to prescribed regulations, through the observance of a rule which gives scope and opportunity for the exercise of the virtue of obedience. As in the life of the individual ascetic there is progress from the observance of one counsel of perfection to another, and from the less rigorous to the more rigorous practice of the same counsel, so in the history of asceticism there was progress from the individual strivings of many seekers after perfection to the united action of many finding in corporate activity a life of fraternal love and service in which the social as well as the individual virtues might find expression and out of which might arise a social condition in which there should be no distinction of precept and counsel. When the latter stage was reached asceticism became monasticism.

It is futile, therefore, to attempt to separate monasticism from the ascetical movement out of which it grew, or to refer its origin to external causes, when the elements entering into its composition were already to hand and needed only to be united and coordinated. These elements existed in the Christian Church from the beginning. The highest ideal of perfection was the life of Christ. None, it is true, might hope to equal that perfect model; but there were other standards, over and above the mere requirements of the law, that lay within the reach of all. The gospel, in holding up those standards, defined in outline at least the main features of the ascetical life. Thus poverty, renunciation, fasting, vigilance, mortification, chastity, virginity, prayer and meditation are all inculcated as means to the attainment of perfection. The manner and measure of these practices were not defined, nor was it made incumbent on the faithful to accept them all. Nevertheless, even from the earliest times there were some Christians, notwithstanding the fact that the great mass of the faithful were drawn from the poorer classes, who abandoned all their earthly possessions in order to practise evangelical poverty, and to be better able to serve God. Speaking of the time of Trajan, Eusebius says: "Most of the disciples of that time, animated by the divine word with a more ardent love for philosophy (*i. e.*, an ascetic manner of life) had already fulfilled the command of the

Saviour, and had distributed their goods to the needy. Then starting out upon long journeys, they performed the office of evangelists, being filled with the desire to preach Christ to those who had not yet heard the word of faith, and to deliver to them the divine gospels."¹⁸ The same thought is found in Hermas, who says the rich must abandon their wealth in order that like stones that are hewed and rounded they may be fit for the Tower of the Kingdom. And yet ascetically-minded as he was, Hermas did not consider that renunciation of private property was necessarily connected with the idea of the Kingdom of God. "The Lord," he says, "ordered their riches to be cut down, not to be taken away forever, that they might be able to do some good with what was left them."¹⁹ Not only men but even women long before the rise of monasticism gave up all they possessed in order to live in voluntary poverty. "As Porphyry puts it angrily (*Macar., Magnes* III, 5): "Not in the far past, but only yesterday, Christians read Matt. XIX, 21, to prominent women, and persuaded them to share all their possessions and goods among the poor, to reduce themselves to beggary, to ask charity, and thus to sink from independence into unseemly pauperism, reducing themselves from their former good position to a woebegone condition, and being finally obliged to knock at the doors of those who were better off."²⁰ History has preserved the names of some of those who undertook the practice of voluntary poverty: Cyprian, who sold his estates and distributed the proceeds among the poor,²¹ Origen who disposed of his collection of valuable old books, and confined himself to four oboli a day,²² and Gregory Thaumaturgus who got rid of all his possessions the better to practice the true Christian life.²³ In none of these cases nor in any of the references to poverty in the writings of the early Christians is there any indication that social reform was the motive for this renunciation of private property.

¹⁸ *His. Ecc.*, III, 37.

¹⁹ *Pastor. Similitude*, IX, 30.

²⁰ See Harnack, *The Mission and Expansion of Christianity*, vol. II, p. 74.

²¹ Pontius, *Vita Cypriani*, 2.

²² Eusebius, *His. Eccl.*, VI, 3.

²³ Gregory of Nyssa, *Vita Greg. Thaum.*, ch. 29.

The strongest evidence, however, of the deep impression made on the early Church by the ascetic idea is found in the attitude taken by large numbers of Christians towards sexual relations. Virginity and chastity were considered to be the summit and crown of ascetic holiness. On this species of mortification the apostles and the apostolic Church set the seal of approval.²⁴ To be a virgin was "to bear the whole yoke of the Lord and to be perfect."²⁵ So highly esteemed was the condition of the chaste and continent that as early as the beginning of the second century, admonitions were addressed to them not to be puffed up by their exceptional position and their triumph over rebellious flesh. "Let him that is pure in the flesh not grow proud of it and boast," says Clement of Rome, "knowing that it was another who bestowed on him the gift of continence."²⁶ It was a source of pride to the Christians, that so many among them could lead such austere lives. Justin Martyr boasted that he knew men and women of every race who had practised this form of self-denial from infancy, and who had remained pure during sixty or seventy years.²⁷ The love for celibacy took deep root in the Church, and in order to live in closer union with God, Christian men and women remained unmarried all their lives.²⁸ "Some of us," says Tertullian, "beat away from them entirely the power of sensual sin, by a virgin continence, still boys in this respect when they are old."²⁹ Even the pagans, struck by the widespread practice of virginity among the Christians, could not refrain from encomiums on the religion which had produced such heroic self-denial. The unemotional physician Galen says of them: "For their contempt of death is patent to us all, as is their abstinence from the use of the sexual organs, by a certain impulse of modesty. For they in-

²⁴ 1 Cor., VII, 1 seq. Acts, XXI, 9.

²⁵ Didache, VI, 2. On this passage of the Didache, see Zöckler, *loc. cit.*, p. 157.

²⁶ Ep. to Corinthians, chap. XXXVIII; see also Ignatius, *Ep. to Polycarp*, chap. V.

²⁷ *Apol.*, chap. XV.

²⁸ Athenagoras, *Legatio*, chap. XXXIII. Minucius Felix, *Octavius*, chap. XXXI.

²⁹ *Apology*, chap. IX.

clude men and women, who refrain from cohabiting all through their lives, and they also number individuals who in ruling and controlling themselves, and in their keen pursuit of virtue, have attained a pitch not inferior to that of real philosophers.”³⁰ Contact with the world and the increasing number of converts from all walks of life in the third century intensified the ascetical strivings of the Christians and increased the number of those who devoted themselves to lives of continence. Treatises were written in praise of virginity.³¹ It was lauded as the distinctively Christian virtue,³² the apex and the consummation of all the virtues.³³ Celibacy was said to be the most perfect course in life and those who practised it were called the true priests of God.³⁴

Though the virgins in the early church did not withdraw from the ordinary intercourse of life, the idea was borne in on them that it was necessary to cut themselves off from contact with the grossness of the world.³⁵ In fact so strong was this feeling that the ascetics were considered to form a class apart from the rest of the community. A special place was assigned to them in the churches.³⁶ Because they were ascetics they were enumerated with the bishops, priests and deacons as forming a class apart from the rest of the faithful.³⁷ The importance of this distinction cannot be too strongly insisted on as showing that a separation had already taken place between the ascetics and the other members of the Christian communities.

The separation was made complete when some Christian ascetics withdrew entirely from the haunts of men and took up their abode in the deserts or other out of the way places in order to lead a more thorough life of renunciation. Who the

³⁰ *De Sententiis Politiae Platonicae*, extant in Arabic. Hist. Anteislam. Abulfedae. Cf. Harnack, *Mission and Expansion*, p. 213.

³¹ Cyprian, *De Habitu Virginum*. Methodius, *Convivium Decem Virginum*.

³² Methodius, *Ibid.*, I, 5.

³³ Lactantius, *Divine Institutes*, VI, 23.

³⁴ Eusebius, *Demonstratio Evangelica*, I, 8-9.

³⁵ Tertullian, *De Virg. Vel.*, III. Cyprian, *Ep.*, 62.

³⁶ Tertullian, *Liber de Exhortatione Castit.*, XI.

³⁷ Hippolytus, *Fragmenta in Proverbia*. Origen, *In Num. Hom.*, II, 1.

first hermits were and at what precise date the eremitical life first manifested itself in the Christian church it is impossible to decide. It is certain, however, that when Anthony, the best known of these recluses, commenced his anchoretic life he was able to seek guidance and counsel from others who had preceded him. The chronology of the life of St. Anthony is the best and surest guide to the order of development in this stage of monastic growth.³⁸ The generally accepted opinion is that St. Anthony was born about A. D. 250, at Coma, near Heracleopolis in Middle Egypt. His parents, who were wealthy Christians, died when he was about eighteen, and six months afterwards Anthony, because of the impression which some words he had heard in church made upon him, resolved to rid himself of all his possessions and turn to a life of poverty and solitude.³⁹ After spending some time in the neighborhood of his native village visiting and receiving instruction from the recluses who dwelt round about, he decided to seek a more isolated place to carry on his struggle for perfection.

The first retreat he selected was a tomb which he changed afterwards for a ruined tower. Here he shut himself in and for twenty years carried on the struggle against the flesh and the devil. The fame of his austerities however, attracted many others to his retreat, and before the twenty years of his retirement had passed, hundreds had settled around him eager to profit by his example and to emulate his virtues. For these Anthony was a father and a model. Their rule of life was to imitate his, and thus without any effort on his part he was placed in the position of guiding a community of ascetics. While it would not be accurate to designate this ascetical colony as a monastery, still it contained the germ of the idea which was afterwards put into effect in other parts of Egypt. Other eremitical settlements modelled upon that which had grown up around the cell of Anthony soon sprang up in other places. They were composed of men who were not hampered in their self-denial and austerities by subjection to a superior, and who were free to go or stay as they chose. This was not monasticism

³⁸ See Butler, *Lausiac, History of Palladius*, vol. I, p. 215 seq.

³⁹ *Life of St. Anthony*, by Athanasius.

strictly so-called, but in yielding to the community idea without absolutely surrendering the life of the solitary, a distinctive step in advance was made towards the next and final stage, with its rules and its vow of obedience.

This stage was reached through the efforts of Pachomius, a younger contemporary of Anthony, who about the year A. D. 305 or 306,⁴⁰ after being released from military service, and being desirous of learning the wisdom of the ascetics, betook himself to a colony of hermits, where he placed himself under the direction of an old man named Palaemon. After many years' experience of rigorous discipline under his master, he left and about A. D. 322, took up his residence at Tabennisi with the distinct purpose of organizing the ascetical life on different lines. He collected around him a band of disciples and drew up a set of rules for their guidance. The cells of the monks were situated close together; they had a common treasury; their daily actions were made to conform to the same discipline and routine, and they were compelled to render obedience to the head of the community. Thus under the influence of Pachomius and as a direct result of the organization of the hermit colonies, the eremitical life was changed to the monastic. It is not necessary to speculate on the reasons which led Pachomius to introduce this sweeping transformation. The assertion that he found the ideal in the lives of the devotees of Serapis has perience of rigorous discipline under his master, he left and, much more natural supposition to say, that the spirit of organization and subordination was derived from his experience in the army. The wisdom of his action was shown by the rapidity with which monastic establishments founded on his rule were established. Each monastery had its own abbot and the general affairs of the order were regulated at an annual meeting or general chapter of the order, thus showing a perfection of monastic organization which was not reached elsewhere until centuries later. Convents for women were established as well as for men, and in the short lifetime of Pacho-

⁴⁰ Zückler, *Askese und Mönchtum*, p. 194. Ladeuze, *Étude sur le oenobitisme pachomien pendant le ive siècle et la 1re moitié du ve*. P. 150 seq.

mius—he died in 345—nine monasteries containing more than three thousand monks and nuns came into existence. The rule of Pachomius, in the form in which it has come down to us, contains regulations covering the different phases of monastic and conventual life. It is not reasonable to suppose that the form of the rule which Pachomius finally determined on was that which he drew up at first. Many of its prescriptions and canons were undoubtedly the result of experience, and monastic discipline as it was developed under his hands reflected credit on his prudence and his moderation. In addition to making the three standards of conventual life, poverty, chastity, and obedience, the foundation of the monastic state, he legislated for the ordinary affairs of the daily life of monks, food, clothing, hours of prayer and work, and left a constitution providing not only for the management but the perpetuation of the society.

There were thus two forms of monastic life in Egypt, the conventual life of the monks of Pachomius and the semi-eremitical or Antonian. The latter was the form which by the end of the fourth century prevailed throughout lower Egypt from Lycopolis to the Mediterranean. The most famous of these semi-eremitical colonies were in the deserts of Nitria and Scete, where as Palladius ⁴¹ informs us, there were as many as five thousand monks. These Antonian monks differed from the followers of Pachomius inasmuch as they were not bound to the observance of any rule. It was optional with them to live in complete solitude or dwell in the same cell as others. They owed obedience to no one, and each was left to his own devices in finding means of ascetical practice and perfection.

From Egypt the monastic movement spread to the rest of Christendom.⁴² It was carried to Mesopotamia by Mar-Awgin, and by St. Hilarion to Syria from where it went to Armenia. St. Basil introduced it into Asia Minor, and St. Martin and Cassian to Gaul. Through the influence and activity of St.

⁴¹ *Historia Lausiaca*, chap. 29.

⁴² See Willis Bond, on "Celtic Monasticism" in *The Celtic Church in Wales*.

Athanasius and St. Jerome it received a foothold in Italy, and finally, in the rule of St. Benedict, all the various streams of monastic effort were crystallized and adapted to suit the needs of the Western World.

This summary of the antecedents and the rise of monasticism shows that it was not an isolated historical phenomenon. It traced its growth, not to an extinct spirit of communism in Christianity, but was on the contrary the clear result and logical culmination of an unbroken line of ascetical effort going back to the very foundation of the Christian religion. If it appeared first in remote districts and country places, it was not because these were just brought into contact with the Christian religion, but for the prosaic reason, that they afforded the solitude which the city dweller could not find at home, and because they were the natural field for the display of that spirit of retirement which is inseparable from ascetical practices.

It is equally erroneous to assert that the cessation of persecution in the Roman Empire and the consequent change in the legal status of the Christians was the direct cause of the rise of monasticism. Anthony, as we have seen, during his twenty years of retirement between 270 and 290 A. D. had collected around him a band of disciples who had formed a semi-eremitical colony of monks at least twenty years before the publication of the edict of Milan. It is true that the spread of monasticism was undoubtedly conditioned by the hostile attitude of the state, and that before the final capitulation it would have been impossible to establish monasteries in the Roman dominions in defiance of the authorities; but the removal of a prohibition which retarded the full manifestation of the monastic tendency, can scarcely be regarded as the sole contributing factor in its origin. The spread of monasticism to other portions of the Empire after the time of persecution was not due to any latent spirit of communism in the Christian doctrines, but very largely because the tendency to self-denial had found a sufficient outlet in the burden of almost constant social and political repression. Living under the sword is not conducive to seeking other methods of mortification. With the removal of

the fear of death, the self-sacrifice which had become ingrained in the Christian character found another means of expression and turned naturally to a system whose constituent factors of poverty and obedience were already familiar. Why this ascetic principle reached its culmination in Egypt it would be difficult to say. Doubtless it was largely, if not solely, through the personal influence of one man.

To see in monasticism a revolt against the "world in the church" or primarily as a revolt of any kind is hardly a fair statement of the case. The neglect of this world was merely a consequence of an earnest effort to realize fully the life of the soul. It is a travesty of history to seek in the retirement of the monks and hermits from the general life of the time any desire of revolt or any spirit of protest against the church or its constitution. It is sufficient to mention the men whose names come most readily to mind when considering the history of the church in the fourth and fifth centuries to show that those who were most active in administering ecclesiastical affairs, Anthanasius, Basil, Gregory, Chrysostom, Ambrose, Augustine, Jerome, were also the leaders in the monastic movement, as Tertullian, Cyprian, Origen and Gregory had been in promoting the cause of asceticism in the time of persecution. Far from being regarded as a dissident element, the monks were called on to aid in the repression of error, as when Basil established a monastic community in Cappadocia to check the encroachments of Arianism. In fact, so strong was the feeling that Sozomen⁴³ attributed the downfall of the Eunomian and Apollinarist heresies to the fact that the monks opposed them; "for the people admired the monks who manifested their virtue by works, and believed that they held right opinions."

And as there was no revolt against the Church, there is no evidence of the influence of economic causes in bringing about the monastic movement. As generally understood, economic action of a collectivist character leads men to make a joint effort to improve the conditions of their physical life, to provide themselves with shorter hours of work and larger remuneration for

⁴³ *His. Eccl.*, VI, 27.

their labor, to secure the comforts and a reasonable amount of the luxuries of life. Under the pressure of a common effort for the common good each one should be made to contribute something to the general welfare, and none should be excluded from the accruing benefits, and as a consequence there should be no restriction on the legitimate exercise of the natural instincts. If "economics" means anything at the present time, it refers simply and solely to physical life and the means of subsistence. Monasticism, on the contrary, placed physical life and material things in the background; it did not concern itself with work except as a means to spiritual perfection, and to provide the bare necessities of life; it avoided ease as a detriment to virtue; it reduced the conditions of physical life to a minimum and carefully shunned comfort and luxury. The very nature of the institution shows that it could not have arisen from any purpose of reforming society. It was not intended to appeal to men at large, nor to produce any equalization of social condition. The institution of the novitiate, that means of sifting and selecting, shows its exclusive character, and none but those who proved acceptable, after a period of trial and probation were admitted to the benefits of monastic communism. Any scheme of economic reform containing such a provision would be regarded as an attempt at brigandage.

The fundamental difference, however, between monasticism and economic communism, one which really precludes any adequate comparison, is found in the fact that monasticism was based on celibacy. With the exclusion of sex and family relations society is reduced to very simple elements, in fact, there is no society in the sense of the civil society with whose affairs economists busy themselves.

Whatever may be thought of the communistic character of monasticism as an existing institution its achievements and its development show clearly that in essence and purpose it was essentially individualistic. It was founded on the distinctive note of Christianity that every man is directly responsible to his Creator; in fact so deeply rooted was this idea that asceticism may be regarded as the progressive expression of personal ac-

countability. When in order to gain salvation, men undertook to observe the evangelical counsels they thereby cut themselves off to a greater or less extent from the common life around them, and when this separation had reached the stage shown in the lives of the hermits and the solitaries, individualism had reached its zenith. Monasticism was an attempt to provide a norm for individual effort in ascetical practice, by offering at once scope for the practice of the social virtues and acting as a check on the extravagances to which unguided effort might lead. The individualistic character of the ascetical life was not lost however, by being turned into monastic coöperation. "The dominating principle that pervaded Egyptian monachism in all its manifestations—whether the purely eremitical, the semi-eremitical of Nitra, or the cenobitical," says Dom Butler, "was a spirit of strongly marked individualism. Each worked for his personal advance in virtue; each strove to do his utmost in all kinds of ascetical exercises and austerities—in prolonging his fasts, his prayers, his silence. The favorite name used to describe any of the prominent monks was 'great athlete,' and they were athletes, and filled with the spirit of the modern athlete. They loved to 'make a record' in austerities, and to contend with one another in mortifications; and they would freely boast of their spiritual achievements."⁴⁵ The inherent individualism of monasticism was strikingly illustrated after its introduction into the East. The tendency shown in Egypt to go from the eremitical to the monastic was reversed, and the cenobitical was made in many cases merely the preliminary to greater austerities in the solitary state.

Monasticism cannot therefore be looked on as communistic either in source or history. It was not an expression of the dissatisfaction of the proletariat with their economic surroundings, nor was it in any sense of the word a communistic effort to apply the teachings of the Gospel to social relations. It was based on the Gospel, and reached its final stage as a means of promoting a closer union of the soul with God by emancipation from worldly cares and prepossessions.

⁴⁵ Lausiac, *History of Palladius*, vol. I, p. 237.

Of the later history and further development of monasticism it is not necessary to speak. Its influence on the spread of civilization and on the economic development in lands brought under the sway of the Christian religion was due to the spirit of faith which animated its votaries, and a desire for the attainment of perfection in the love and service of others. Monastic settlements were humanizing centres from which rough barbarians frequently learned the first lessons of order and government. The laborious lives of the monks gave an impetus to industry and regular occupation. With the hope of no reward except in a life to come, the monks cleared the forests, drained the swamps, reclaimed barren land, built roads and bridges, and laid the foundation of permanent institutions and prosperity by teaching the ignorant and half-savage peoples among whom they lived the principles of agriculture and mechanical pursuits. The monasteries were the refuge of the poor and the wanderer. The resources which they held were administered in the relief of the needy. Hospitals were built, schools were established, and in regions of ignorance and darkness the first glimmerings of art and science and refinement which illuminated the lives of the untutored children of the soil or the forest were those which came from the monasteries.

Not less noteworthy was the service of the monks in preserving the literary treasures of the old civilizations. Their libraries, their scriptoria and their industry are the link which connect the civilization of the present with that of the remote past. They wrote the history of their time, they protested against its vices, and they found in the ideals which they chose to follow the light to guide them in darkness. All these labors were, however, but secondary to the main purpose of their career as monks. The practice of religion, not social reform was their object.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

WAGES AND THE RIGHT TO A LIVELIHOOD.¹

This book from the pen of a Catholic, who is also a theologian and a moralist, is naturally of special significance to Catholic students of the social question. It deserves, however, the attention of all, whether Catholic or non-Catholic, who are interested in the history of economic doctrines, particularly the economic doctrines of the theologians. Often condemned in the name of Science, the economic opinions of the Schoolmen are now found to embody some of the most general and the deepest impulses of our time. We were certainly not prepared to see these medieval doctrines come into close contact with modern life and suggest solutions almost identical with the remedies offered by men who have little regard for theological systems. Dr. Ryan is exceptionally qualified to bring out this truth effectively. He is not only a theologian. He possesses also a thorough economic training, has an exact conception of contemporary industrial life, and shows a distinctively American genius for practical solutions. Not content with a forcible restatement of the scholastic teaching, nor with the adaptation of it to present needs, he subjects it to the test of scientific criticism, and strives to illustrate and define its basis in the light of philosophy and political economy. The outcome of his efforts is a solid and comprehensive solution of a problem which has been much discussed among Socialists, and which has left its impress on the social evolution of the entire nineteenth century, namely, the problem of a right to a livelihood.

¹ This paper was condensed by Dr. Brocard from his preface to the French version of Dr. Ryan's "Living Wage." Dr. Brocard is professor of Political Economy at the University of Nancy. The Preface contains a scholarly analysis of the subject, laying special emphasis upon the historical basis and continuity of the Catholic teaching on the ethics of wages.

The translation of the present article was made by Rev. Paul Perigord, of the St. Paul Seminary.

It is under this clearly defined aspect that Dr. Ryan discusses the theory of a living wage. He continues, after Leo XIII and many French Catholic social thinkers, the teaching of the medieval theologians. Anton Menger maintains in "The Right to the Full Product of Labor" that the doctrine of the right to a livelihood originated with the Socialists and Communists, but it was undoubtedly proclaimed several centuries earlier by the Schoolmen. The idea of a right to a living is the central point of their ethico-economic doctrine. Upon the necessity and duty of safeguarding this right, the theologians, following St. Thomas, have based all economic doctrines, especially that of private property. For them private ownership is a social function as well as a right,—or rather a right which is justified by its function—differing widely from that absolute and exclusive right which the individualistic school has borrowed from the Roman Jurists. "Need," writes Dr. Ryan, faithfully interpreting the theologians,, "is the end to which all other titles are but means, and to which, consequently, all others must give way, even that of the private proprietor." It is, of course, extreme need that is in question here; for the theologians, holding that wealth was desirable only in so far as it was necessary for the realization of our supernatural end, did not concern themselves with any other kind. Within these limits, however, their teaching is very rigorous. They maintain that the private owner may not oppose his proprietary right to the right springing from extreme need, that a hungry man has the right to sustain his life from the goods of his neighbor. They declare with Aristotle and St. Thomas that if the right of property is individual its use must be communal. In the last analysis their thought clearly is that society is bound to provide the individual, in return for a normal measure of activity, with the conditions of living in accordance with his station. In their opinion the regime of private property is justified because of its fitness to obtain this result. Did it fail to fulfill this purpose private ownership would forfeit the very basis of its legitimacy. "The Fathers of the Church," says Dr. Ryan, "and the theologians of the Middle Ages unanimously taught that every human being

has a natural right to a share of this world's goods for his sustenance. They looked upon this as a natural right, independent of all human laws, conventions and institutions, and superior to them all." It does not follow, however, that these theologians were the precursors of Socialism. Some of their ideas are also held by the Socialists, but they do not necessarily lead to the Socialist system. Among these is the idea of the right to a livelihood.

Upon this idea the theologians built their doctrine of wages; but they gave it a special application to the peculiar social conditions of their time. Their doctrine of wages was but a particular application of their theory of exchange. Labor was not as yet subject to the fluctuations of supply and demand, and the number of hired workers was small relatively to the number of independent producers: consequently the theologians directed their attention to the problem of justice with reference to the exchange of goods. The fair price of goods was determined by the concept of equivalence, that is, it was realized when the selling price equaled the cost of production as determined by the social estimate. In the cost of production was included the remuneration of the laborers, which was itself to be determined by the social estimate of the amount required to enable them to live in accordance with their position or status. Thus the theory of wages became identified with the theory of just price.

In the place of the social estimate as a determinant of fair prices, the nineteenth century put supply and demand and applied this measure to labor as well as to merchandise. The result was that the idea of equivalence as a criterion of justice disappeared, the interplay of supply and demand was elevated to the rank of an inviolable economic law, and wages became deplorably mean and insufficient.

By the middle of the nineteenth century, however, the misery of the working classes had provoked a new school of economic thought, holding theories very similar to, if not identical with, the doctrines of the medieval theologians. The movement, Christian at its inception, fell after 1870 under the control

of avowed opponents of Christianity. It criticised vigorously and sometimes excessively the theories of the individualistic school, denied the fatal and inevitable character of economic laws, especially the law of wages, exposed the abuse and evils of free competition, and insisted that the human will and legislation had a great part to play in social evolution. Its practical aim was the betterment of the condition of the working class: according to some of its followers, in the present industrial regime; according to others, under a regime of Socialism. It asserted not merely the right to the full product of labor, but the right to a livelihood.

A little later there arose a school of Catholic theologians and economists that, especially after the favorable pronouncements of Leo XIII, displayed a considerable measure of activity. Though representing a great variety of opinions, its members are of one mind in their sympathy for the working class. They are unanimous in asserting with the theologians, with the socialists, and with the interventionists of every kind, the rights of the laborer against society; and they have attempted to construct a Catholic doctrine of wages, by adapting the theological tradition to the data of modern science. The criticism of individualism made by the Socialist, interventionist, and the historical schools provided the Catholic thinkers with many negative elements which they have utilized to good purpose, particularly in refuting the assumed fatal and inviolable character of economic laws. On its constructive side their undertaking was more difficult, nor was it at first brilliantly carried out. As Professor Ely said in presenting Dr. Ryan's book to the American public, "enlightenment has not kept pace with good intention. The plain man of whom we hear so much has a feeling that our teachers and preachers are vague and indefinite. Is there, after all, such thing as a Christian doctrine of wages?" Even in Europe where the attempts to deduce from the teachings of the Church such a doctrine have been more frequent, who will say that complete success has been achieved? The European Catholic writers have appealed by turns or simultaneously to the concept of the right to a livelihood, and to the idea of

equivalence in exchanges, forgetting that the latter is becoming more and more unintelligible, and that in certain cases it conflicts with the former. What is to be said when the utility furnished by the employer to the employee in the form of wages is equivalent to that received from the latter in the form of labor, and yet is insufficient for his sustenance? This question never confronted the medieval theologians because, in their theory, the selling price of goods was to be determined by the needs of the producer, such needs as are implied in a becoming livelihood. Today, however, prices influence wages as truly as wages affect prices. On the other hand, how are we to deal with the case in which the wages that are the equivalent of the service exceed the amount necessary for the sustenance of the laborer? May the employer retain the surplus? Finally, what is the irreducible minimum for a decent livelihood?

On none of these points have Catholics been clear or unanimous. One of the great merits of Dr. Ryan's book is that it discusses them all, and attempts to give clear solutions. His conclusions may be contested, but his method is precise, and incontestibly scientific. He decides the conflict between the principle of the right to a livelihood and the principle of equivalence in favor of the former. Not that he denies the necessity of a certain relation between labor and wages, nor the justice of a higher wage for more productive labor: but the concept of equivalence, which he subjects to penetrating criticism, seems to him in our time to be incapable of precise determination. It can even be interpreted in such a way as to justify the exploitation of the victims of the sweat-shop. Hence our author concentrates his attention, after the method of the theologians and Leo XIII, on the right to a livelihood.

His first care is to establish clearly the principle, in order later on to draw therefrom with inflexible logic the consequences which it can and should bring about in present society. At the basis of his teaching we find the fundamental and far-reaching idea which individualism and the philosophers of the eighteenth century borrowed from Christianity, or rediscovered, and which afterwards was adopted in varying degrees

by the makers of the French Revolution, the Socialists, and defenders of democracy generally. It is the idea that human personality has an intrinsic value, from which it derives the right to be treated, in the words of Kant, not as a means, but as an end. According to Dr. Ryan, this principle is the anchor of salvation both for the individual and for society. He denies that the essential rights of the individual are based upon the social good. Not that there is any contradiction between individual and social interest: on the contrary, they are identical in the long run; but they must not be confused, nor must the social welfare be so emphasized that the weak minority will be oppressed by the strong majority, or all the individuals be sacrificed to the god of the State. The author points out the dangers of the theories of Hegel and Burke, to which he might have added those of Comte. Consequently he approaches the position of the eighteenth century philosophers and the individualists, in as much as he maintains that man has natural rights which the State must hold sacred; but he differs from them in that he does not share their idea of complete equality, nor look for the realization of individual rights through the abolition of social restraint and a return to the "state of nature." He requires that society should safeguard the rights of the individual, and maintains that these rights are equal in substance, but not in extension. Society owes to the least of its members a minimum of advantages; it may accord more than this to some individuals. Among the rights that society may not withhold from any of its members is the right to a livelihood. This right, according to Dr. Ryan, is based upon the duty of the individual to preserve his life and develop his personality by means of the goods of the earth. Now, since these goods become appropriated under the direction of society, it is the duty of the latter so to legislate that all individuals may through their labor obtain a decent livelihood. In this Dr. Ryan is a faithful disciple of Leo XIII.

What is to be understood by a decent livelihood? It includes, says the author, those goods which will not only secure the laborer against starvation, but permit him to exercise his facul-

ties and develop his personality. It means, moreover, those things which are necessary for the support of a wife and children; for marriage is man's normal condition, and with some exceptions, necessary for his proper self-development, as well as for the very existence of society. Hence the minimum wage of the laborer ought to provide food that will be sufficient in quantity, quality, and variety, decent clothing, sanitary housing, some cultivation of the mental and moral faculties, and protection against sickness, accident, and old age,—all of these to be understood of the wife as well as of the husband and of the children until they become self-supporting. The amount of wage needed to assure all these benefits will vary with time and place, but the author thinks it cannot be less than six hundred dollars in the cities of America.

This might lead us to a pessimistic conclusion; for in every country of the civilized world, wages fall considerably below this minimum. Is it possible to raise them to this figure? While it is well to affirm the right to a decent livelihood and to define its meaning, we must ask ourselves whether the natural resources, the technical and psychological elements of production and the financial condition of industry will permit this abstract right to be converted into concrete reality. On this point Dr. Ryan does not entertain the slightest doubt; and he justifies his position by emphasizing the productive power of modern industry, by showing that the possible supply of goods is now greatly restricted by an insufficient demand, and that higher wages would mean not only a greater demand for products, but a greater efficiency in the producer.

Among the means suggested by the author to better the conditions of the laborer the first is, to assert firmly and explicitly the moral obligation of capitalist, business man, and laborer, and to make clear the fact that these are frequently ignored. From his principle of the right to a decent livelihood, he deduces with incontestible logic the conclusion that the right to a living wage takes precedence of the right of the capitalist to receive interest. The business man, or active director of industry, may take from the product sufficient to meet the essen-

tial needs of himself and family, but his secondary and accidental needs must not be preferred to the primary and vital needs of his employees.

This thesis will undoubtedly startle many readers; but, as Professor Ely remarks, Cardinal Manning startled the English-speaking world some years ago when he declared that the right to subsistence was prior to the rights of property. Yet as we have seen above, this is no new truth, but merely one that was allowed to fall into oblivion. Had the world obeyed this and other moral intuitions regarding wealth we should not be less rich, and we should certainly be far happier. So completely have we ignored them that we are disturbed when we are reminded of their existence. Nevertheless, Dr. Ryan believes that these moral conceptions have not lost their efficacy. "If," he declares, "clergymen would give as much attention to preaching and expounding the duty of paying a living wage as they do to the explanation of other duties that are no more important, and if they would use all the power of their ecclesiastical position to deprive the recalcitrant employers of the Church privileges that are ordinarily denied to persistently disobedient members; and if public speakers and writers who discuss questions of industrial justice would, in concrete terms, hold up to public denunciation those employers who can pay a living wage and will not,—the results would constitute an ample refutation of the libelous assertion that employers cannot be got to act justly by moral suasion. They have never been made to feel a fraction of its power."

But it would be utopian to rely exclusively on moral instruction and public opinion for a betterment of wage conditions. Hence the author advocates the intervention of the State. He does not demand that the State should control production, for Socialism does not seem to him either necessary or desirable; but he protests against that pernicious doctrine of the eighteenth century which maintains that a minimum State activity will lead to the maximum of industrial liberty. Legal liberty is not sufficient, since it merely insures the free play

of economic forces and these are in no wise more legitimate than physical forces. Dr. Ryan compares those who for selfish ends oppose State intervention to the burglar who objects to the activity of the policeman. Only by proper regulation is it possible to secure real industrial liberty. He therefore, advocates legislation for the protection of the working class, particularly, with regard to their right to a decent livelihood, and urges that all countries follow the example of Australia and New Zealand in the enactment of laws prescribing a minimum wage. Nor does he forget to remind the laborers that they, as well as the employers, have duties with respect to the wage question.

We can now readily see the place which Dr. Ryan occupies in the movement of contemporary economic thought. He is among those Catholic social students who adhere firmly to the program of State intervention; but he is above all a moralist who takes his principles seriously and is unwilling that they should remain a dead letter. His own work affords clear proof that ethics and economics may go hand in hand to their mutual advantage.

The application of the fundamental principle that he advocates is fraught with tremendous difficulties. Yet he confidently hopes that specialists and legislators will be able to solve them. He has ably discharged his own task of describing and justifying the ethical ideal. The co-existence in our society of insufficient wages and over production of goods constitutes, both from the economic and moral viewpoints, a monstrous contradiction which cannot be permitted to continue. If modern production, with its immense resources, cannot provide the laboring class with the means of decent existence, then, let us admit that our civilization is bankrupt. On the other hand, if it be true, as we are assured by Mr. Charles Gide, that Christian social principles exert a real influence upon a much larger number of persons than do those of Fourier, Saint-Simon, and Proudhon, we ought to be grateful to Dr. Ryan for having, in the name of Christian ethics, called our attention to the present deplorable

conditions, and to the translator for making that message known to the people of France. In any case it is not most comforting to hear from every quarter, and above the clamor of party and doctrinal conflicts, those words which were first uttered by the theologians, which were taken up and repeated by the Socialists, and which to-day are on every lip: "Man has the right to live by his labor."

LUCIEN BROCARD.

BOOK REVIEWS.

Pascal, sa vie religieuse et son apologie du christianisme, par
H. Petitot. Paris, Beauchesne et cie, 1911. 8vo, 427 pp.

Was Pascal an immanentist? The immanentists are not satisfied with metaphysical and historical proofs. They base their faith solely on the religious sense. Pascal set aside the metaphysical proofs for the existence of God and the immortality of the soul. Still he was not an absolute immanentist, for in his demonstration of the truth of Christianity, he attributed great importance to the positive historic proofs, to miracles and prophecies. Nor did he attach to the proof from inner religious experience a universal validity. He recognized the futility of using it against infidels. He never pushed the principle so far as to make it the sole guide of life. He also recognized the principle of external authority in religion, namely the teaching Church. Pascal was the creator of the restricted method of immanence. He traced its main outlines and principal arguments with so sure a hand that little was needed in after times to give it completeness.

Such is the main point which Father Petitot brings out in this highly interesting volume. He leads up to it by a careful and sympathetic study of Pascal's religious life, which he finds in the main truly Catholic and saintly, not compromised by his Jansenism, which in him was rather theoretic. He refutes the statements made by some authors that in his ascetic life at Port Royal, Pascal was sad, morose, and depressed by the constant fear of eternal torment. On the contrary, his severe austerity was tempered with a quiet, unostentatious Christian joy. He restrained to a large extent outward expressions of affection for his relatives, but at the same time loved them with genuine tenderness of heart. Whether Pascal died in formal schism or not, he thinks is difficult, perhaps, impossible to determine. He depicts his death as that of a devout, saintly Christian, preparing for the end with heroic calmness and resignation to the will of God.

The genuine admiration and sympathy which the author shows for Pascal do not blind him to his faulty views and to the defects of his apologetic argumentation, all of which come up for just

criticism. It is undoubtedly an erudite volume of great merit, and will win a place of honor among the numerous works that have been written on Blaise Pascal.

CHARLES F. AIKEN.

Dictionnaire apologétique de la foi chrétienne, sous la direction
A. d'Ales. Fascicule V, Église-Évangiles. Paris, Beauchesne
et cie, 1910.

As each new part of the Apologetic Dictionary appears, it gives evidence that the high standard of scholarship aimed at in the beginning is being successfully maintained. It was a happy thought of the learned editor to put aside topics of minor importance and thus leave room for a more complete treatment of weighty questions. Many articles in this dictionary are thus rather of the nature of comprehensive, though condensed, treatises. Among the more noteworthy contributions in this fifth fascicule are the well-arranged and, in the main, very satisfactory treatise on the Church, by the Abbé Yves de la Brière, comprising forty pages; the up-to-date article on Egypt, in which the learned author, Father A. Mallon, S. J., gives us the latest results of the researches of Egyptian archeologists; the interesting historic survey of Episcopal Elections in France from the Gallo-Roman period to the fourteenth century, by the Abbe G. Mollat; the erudite and instructive article on Epigraphy, to which the author, Father L. Jalabert, devotes twenty-four pages; the still longer article on slavery, by Paul Allard, who gives a masterly historic treatment of slavery and serfdom from pre-Christian to modern times; the solid and scholarly article on the Eucharist by the Abbé J. Lebreton, comprising nineteen pages, in which the recent theories of rationalists are subjected to learned criticism; the careful study of the Eucharistic Epiclesis, by Father Salaville. These and a few other articles make this fascicule one of great value and interest for students of theology.

CHARLES F. AIKEN.

The Process of Abstraction : An Experimental Study. Thomas Verner Moore. Berkeley, 1910.

The introspective method of establishing the difference between thought and imagery, idea and sensation has been in vogue since the days of Greek philosophy. Another witness now comes to its support. Experimental study, after unsuccessful attempts to show that the imagery present in consciousness exhausts the content of the latter, is now veering about to the old introspective conclusion, coming to its aid with apparatus, criticism, and that painstaking minuteness of inquiry which stamps the man of science. An example of this delicate and careful weighing of evidence, with a wary eye all the while to the possible presence of a prejudicial grain of dust in the balance, is furnished in the dispassionate and convincing piece of research into the process of abstraction as revealed in the adult mind, undertaken by Doctor Moore, of our Faculty of Philosophy, and published under the auspices of the University of California, where the experiments were originally conducted.

After reviewing critically the literature of the problem, and indicating the method of research, which is that of allowing geometrical figures to stand for a group of qualities, the author describes his experiments, catalogues the results, and outlines the interpretation to which the facts unmistakably point. There are two main results of this experimental analysis. The first is the fact that thought without imagery exists, even in the test case of visible objects, where, if anywhere, we should naturally expect to find visual imagery present and highly developed, if it played the leading rôle assigned to it by a large school of modern psychologists. The existence of imageless thoughts must therefore be acknowledged as an established mental fact, and one's idea of a physical object be regarded as something more than a mere mental picture of the same. So far from being essential to perception, the formation of a reproducible mental image represents a later stage altogether.

The establishment of this fact by experiment is important, but what is disestablished by it is more important still. Those psychologists who confidently proclaim that thought simply cannot go on without images, and that there must be some carelessness of observation on the part of the experimenter who says it can, will find the

ground completely cut from under their cherished prejudgments. And dare one hope that the philosophers—*durum genus*—will see the utter falseness of approaching the problem of knowledge ever and always from the representative side? This way madness lies, and the great transcendental X of Kant. Much, if not all of the ills philosophy is heir to spring from false approaches to problems, like that of knowledge, and would disappear in a change of avenues.

The second fact brought out by this experimental analysis is the part played by universal ideas, when we are perceiving individual objects. Perception, says the author, as a process of assimilating the data of sense-experience to their appropriate mental categories. He understands by this latter term none of the formalistic terrors of Kant's terminology, much less any doctrine of innate mental forms. The initial stage of abstraction, which is the process of perception, he finds to be one of assimilating the sensation to previously formed mental categories. These categories and their function in perception are facts. Their origin is another matter. The most general of all the mental categories—'something'—starts the process of knowing in the child. As time wears on, this vague awareness of 'something happening' develops into an awareness that something of a more particular nature has happened, and so further and still further mental categories are formed and developed. The acquired results of past experience thus become the categories into which future experience is received, and the exclusive mental origin, which Kant claimed for these categories, is seen to be without warrant in fact, or utility in psychology.

In thus showing by experimental analysis that the 'concept' is essentially distinct from imagery and feeling, and that, so far from being faint second-impressions of the latter, 'concepts' are really the high lights of unconsciousness, bright and definite even when all else is dim, the author has rewritten an old chapter of scholastic philosophy fraught with significance for modern thought. It strikes the reviewer that in many cases descriptive psychology is guilty of gross neglect in passing over the non-sensorial contents of consciousness, as if these were pale and featureless. The worship of mental images amounts nowadays to a superstition. The reviewer hopes that this study will have a large circle of readers. It exemplifies the Leonine counsel: *vetera novis augere et perficere*.

The author has another study which might prove of interest to many: "the influence of temperature and the electric current on the sensibility of the skin." In this study the author investigates from a new point of view the relation between the stimulus and the sensation, coming to the conclusion that the tactual sensibility of the skin is a function of the degree of dissociation in the tissues.

EDMUND T. SHANAHAN.

La sainté Trinité. Lectures théologiques. L. Berthé. Paris. Bloud, 1911. Pp. 218.

In this volume we have an admirable collection of texts from all the great Christian writers, on the august mystery of the Trinity. The place of honor is occupied by Saint Thomas. Upon the pages of the Angel of the Schools are concentrated the rays of light emanating from the minds of fathers, school-men, and modern Christian thinkers. The result is a clear, full, and stirring presentation, one that rouses the religious emotions, and floods the intellect with an unction of nobility. The collective testimony, massed upon each point treated, has a literary effect also. The reader feels all Christian humanity behind him when he reads the great utterances in which truly great men expressed the common faith. Priests and seminarians will find in this volume a very useful addition to the tract on the Trinity. The treatment is such that difficult notions are made easy, and presented in a form calculated to attract by its graces rather than to repel by the technicalities of speech. There is warmth as well as clearness of thought in every page, and the Catholic doctrine is made to stand out prominently. The whole volume reminds one of a reasoned prayer, and fittingly ends in the prayers addressed by Saint Hilary and Saint Augustine to God One and Triune.

EDMUND T. SHANAHAN.

Les origines de la théologie moderne. I. La Renaissance de l'Antiquité chrétienne (1450-1521), par l'abbé A. Humbert. "Bibliothèque Théologique" series. Paris. Lecoffre, 1911. Pp. 358.

The first volume on the beginnings of modern theology is so exceedingly well done that the author should feel highly encouraged to bring the subject matter to completion in the companion volume which he has in mind. It is a long time since such a direct, critical, and appreciative study of sources has fallen into the reviewer's hands. Modern theology was born of a dislike for scholasticism. It tried, so to speak, to execute a flanking movement around scholasticism, to the position in the rear occupied, or supposed to be occupied by the fathers and the primitive Christian tradition. The result of this attempted return to Christian antiquity, without taking the laws of history into account, was the irreparable loss of all the development which mediaeval theology represented and brought to the fore. The theology of the schoolmen had a broad, informing spirit; it distinguished aspects, but it did not allow its distinctions to amount to separations, and so it was saved from the fallacy of actually separating what in reality belonged together. Not so modern theology, which plunged headlong into separatism, and has remained there ever since. The author takes up successively for treatment the prevailing dislike for mediaeval theological ideas; the efforts of humanism in Italy, England, France, and Germany to make a new synthesis of Catholic doctrine; the beginnings of the reform theories and their one-sided development; and finally the transformations which the ideas of the Gospel and their interpretation by the Fathers underwent at the hands of the so-called restorers. All these subjects are treated directly according to the sources; copious quotations abound at every turn, making it easy to fix the successive points of development which characterized the progress of the doctrines of reform. The religious revolution of the sixteenth century may here be studied in its rise with great profit by all. The volume is one which commends itself not only to professed theologians, but to those interested in religious history generally. We have long needed a work which would show convincingly that modern theology, as distinct from scholastic, is separatist and exclusivist in character. This want is now admirably filled.

A few instances of the treatment. In the chapter on the traditional directions of Christian thought, the author brilliantly shows that on the eve of the reformation there were three great lines of thought—the ecclesiastical, the scholastic, and the mys-

tical. The distinction of these three imposed on all minds a doctrinal equilibrium. A Saint Bonaventure, a Saint Thomas, a Gerson saw no impossibility in reconciling these three tendencies embedded in the traditional doctrine on the character and the authority of Scripture in matters of faith. All three lines of thought co-existed in the same mind without incommoding or excluding one another. It was Erasmus and his disciples who dissolved this triple alliance of tendencies, substituting mutually exclusive fragments for the integral whole, and making separate elements out of what should have been merely distinguished, and left to enjoy that "unity in difference" which is the characteristic of all organic life. Is not this the quintessence of the art of presentation? Protestantism has always sought a "retrospective paternity" for its doctrines, finding it here and there in the letter, but seeking in vain that separatistic spirit which alone would make its paternity true.

In the chapter on precursors, the author traces the rise of sentimentalism, and legalism, and the consequent eclipsing of the intellectual side of faith, the necessary reaction from which was the strengthening of the sense of the authority of the Church and her teaching magistracy, among Catholic theologians. The chapter on humanism—that veritable invasion of the Christian world by pagan ideas—is finely done. Here it was that Ockam's axiom of simplicity entered into the heart of the system of Protestantism, to play its destructive role from the transcendental X of Kant to the pragmatism of our day. In the part devoted to the *Philosophia Christi*, the author traces the invasion of the juristic and social spirit, which was to end finally in the apotheosis of piety, charity, and the doing of good to one's neighbor. Erasmianism destroyed that very past to which it so clamorously insisted on returning. The chapter on the theology of Wittenberg shows how the opposition to Aristotle had become general, and how the visible and invisible worlds were set over against each other in the violent opposition of nature and grace. The sole authority of the Scriptures was affirmed, and an attempt made to construct a theology from its pages. But in this attempt, Protestantism fell into glaring contradiction with its own fundamental principles. It forgot that not all was divine, if the elaboration of the Scriptures into a theology was a piece of human labor. To rid itself of this incon-

sistency, Protestantism proposed another—that, namely, of identifying the Gospel with a particular interpretation of it. Politics completed the separation which humanism had begun.

One lays down this volume with a sense of favors received. The clear, at times epigrammatic style, fixes the landmarks as one goes along. There is much in these pages to be pondered by the teacher, and the missionary to non-Catholics, and to be read with profit by any man in his study. We hope to see the second volume soon. It will be welcome, doubly so, on account of the favorable impression which the first is sure to create.

EDMUND T. SHANAHAN.

Histoire du Bréviaire Romain par Pierre Batiffol. Troisième édition refondue. Paris, 1911.

The Abbé Duchesne's *Les origines du culte Chrétien* reinaugurated the study of the Church's formalities of worship along the historical lines laid down by the great masters of liturgical science in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Written in the same spirit as the works of these scholars, it gave a fresh impetus to research in a department of study which has long been neglected. It confined itself largely, however, to the consideration of the liturgy proper, and gave comparatively small attention to the Church's psalmody. It was this absence of an adequate treatment of the sources of the Breviary which stirred up the Abbé Batiffol, as he tells us, to write his *Histoire du Bréviaire* on the same general lines as those founded by Duchesne. In the present third edition of the *Histoire*, the author has recast a good part of the original work, corrected details here and there, and instead of mere references has given extended quotations from the authors whom he cites in support of his positions. He has printed three interesting documents not found in the previous editions. One, the *Rubricae Novae* of the Breviary of the time of Nicholas III, which he reprints from Mercati's *Appunti*; another, a letter of Marini, one of the congregation appointed by Pius IV, for the revision of the breviary; and the third, certain *Capita Precipua* for a revision proposed in the time of Clement VIII.

The publication of the first edition of this work in 1893 drew forth a number of books and articles on the breviary from various authors, the most notable of which was Dom Bäumer's *Geschichte des Breviers* in 1895. A French translation of this work was issued in 1905. Bäumer took Batiffol to task for his departure from the traditional theory which gave Saint Gregory the Great the honor of having codified the Roman office. In this third edition Batiffol has given careful consideration to Bäumer's arguments. He still, however, stands by the thesis which he put forward in his first edition, maintaining that the Divine Office of the Roman Church originally consisted only of the office of the vigil, that is *Matin* with *Lauds*, and that was not until the seventh or eighth century that the other hours were finally taken over from the monks and made an integral part of the Roman office.

WILLIAM I. MCGARVEY.

A Roman Diary and other Documents relating to the Papal Inquiry into English Ordinations, MDCCCXCVI, by T. A. Lacey. Longmans, 1910.

This is a record, written from an Anglican point of view, of events in Rome during the spring of 1896 when the question of the validity of the orders of the Church of England was under consideration by the special commission appointed by Leo XIII. The author and the Rev. F. W. Puller were the two Anglican theologians who went to Rome at this time in order to afford Mgr. Gasparri and the Abbé Duchesne (the two members of the commission who were supposed to be more or less favorably disposed towards the Anglican side of the question) such information as they might need during the discussion. The Diary then kept by the Rev. Mr. Lacey is here "printed just as it was written, for it is produced as evidence." It "is intended to show what was done, what was said, and what was thought, to indicate even by its silence what was not done." It will be understood, however, that Mr. Lacey's record is only that of an observer from the outside. Of what went on within the Commission, he, of course, had no knowledge whatever beyond the little which came to him from the incidental reports of individuals. And Mgr.

Moyes, one of the members of the Commission, has pointed out, in recent numbers of *The Tablet*, that in several particulars Mr. Lacey's impressions with regard to the attitude of individuals and the action of the Commission were altogether mistaken. In addition to his diary Mr. Lacey has reproduced certain documents not heretofore accessible which will be welcomed by the student. There is the *De Re Anglicana*, which was an unpublished pamphlet prepared by the Anglicans for the private information of the Cardinals as to the present state of the Church of England. It was of course a rather one-sided representation of conditions from the High Church standpoint. On this account it was sharply criticised by another privately printed pamphlet prepared by Mgr. Gasquet and Mgr. Moyes, and entitled *Risposta all' Oposcolo*. This too will be found reprinted in the present volume. Mr. Lacey has also included the letter of Pope Leo XIII acknowledging the receipt of the answer of the two Anglican archbishops to the Bull *Apostolicae Curae*. There is at the end of the volume a fairly complete bibliography of the whole controversy.

It is clear from what Mr. Lacey tells us that the judgment of the *Apostolicae Curae* was one altogether unexpected by the Anglicans. They had for some reason assured themselves that there would be no absolute condemnation of their orders; that, at the most, the Pope would not go further than to declare the orders doubtful. So confident were they of this, that Mr. Lacey and his friends did not hesitate to give it out "that an entirely adverse decision is impossible." "We honestly believe this to be true" (p. 55). When therefore the Holy See judged the orders to be altogether null and void, the disappointment of the Anglicans can scarcely be imagined. To their disappointment succeeded indignation at what in their vexation they construed to be a heartless decision of Rome dictated by worldly-wise policy, and they immediately poured forth from the press a stream of articles and pamphlets in criticism and denunciation of the papal bull. They professed themselves unmoved by the arguments of the Pope, and only all the more confirmed in their belief in the entire validity and legitimacy of their orders. Such was then apparently the only effect of the papal decision upon those identified with the High Church Movement. But, looking back now after the lapse of fifteen years, and comparing the present status of the so-called Catholic party in the Episcopal Church with what it

was before the formal condemnation of Anglican orders, who will say that the decision has not profoundly affected the whole life and activity of that party? Certainly one thing is patent to every observer, the High Church Movement is no longer the aggressive force that it was. In 1895 it was at the height of its success. It had overcome the opposition which for years had been arrayed against it, and its principles had obtained a recognized place in the Episcopal Church everywhere. It had gained one point of vantage after another, and was already boasting that it was only a question of a short time when it would dominate the whole Anglican communion, and place it in such a position that its Catholicism would be in theory and practice as unmistakable as that of Rome itself. Then came the informal advances towards the Holy See in that memorable year of 1896, of which Mr. Lacey's diary tells us something. For the first time Rome took cognizance of the existence of this movement, and listened sympathetically to all that high churchmen had to say. The Holy Father would have welcomed proof of their claim to possess a valid priesthood. But after a patient and thorough investigation the proof was not forthcoming. So Rome issued her judgment. From that day until the present the history of the High Church Movement has been one of steady decline. A paralysis gradually came over the hearts and hands of those who were identified with it, and the advantages they had gained were lost one by one. Now the high churchmen are but a handful, without hearers, without any vision as to the future, and no longer reckoned as a vital force in Anglicanism. At the same time the Episcopal Church is everywhere identifying herself more and more with the other Protestant bodies, and thus demonstrating the truth of the conclusions of the bull *Apostolicae Curae*. The movement originated in 1832 by John Keble was unquestionably a great movement, and was carried on by great men. God had a purpose in permitting it to rise and progress, and that purpose was accomplished by the many souls it brought back into the unity of the Church. But when it no longer served that purpose, and there was the danger of its galvanizing Anglicanism as a body into the semblance of Catholic life, and so constituting it a rival to the Catholic Church in the eyes of those who might be seeking for the ark of safety, God in His providence moved the Holy See to pronounce judgment. Since then the High Church

Movement has steadily melted away. In a few years it will be but a memory in the past. Again *Roma locuta est, causa finita est*.

WILLIAM I. MCGARVEY.

Mysticism: Its True Nature and Value. By A. B. Sharpe, M. A. St. Louis, Mo., B. Herder, 1910. Pp. xi + 233. Price \$1.35.

A scientific account of the theory of mysticism which obtains in the Catholic Church will be certain to impress non-Catholics and come to them as a surprise. To those especially, who imagine that they have found in the late Professor James' *Varieties of Religious Experience* the last word on the subject, Father Sharpe's account of the matter will be, to say the least, unexpected. All students of this important phase of religious experience will recognize the truth of the statement that "the mystic," as Professor Royce says, "is the only thorough-going empiricist." The counterpart of this truth, however, namely, that the mystic is totally unable to account for the certitude with which he holds that his experience is real, brings the student face to face with the essential element in the Catholic theory of mysticism. It is an element which comes naturally to the Catholic mind, but, just as naturally, is always overlooked by the non-Catholic. The element referred to is the fact that the experience of the mystic is supernatural. At the same time, the state of mind of the mystic is not what is known to psychologists as abnormal in the sense of being pathological. "Mystics," writes Father Sharpe, "have always been remarkable for sanity and placidity, even when invalids; the neurotic temperament which belongs to pathological states of consciousness is conspicuously rare, even if not entirely absent among them" (p. 36). Indeed, a certain sanity of mental condition is one of the tests of orthodox mysticism. Conformity to the teaching of the Church is another, as the author points out in his chapter on heretical mystics. Not the least valuable portion of the volume before us is that in which the writings and doctrines of Pseudo-Dionysius are treated with much detail. The author of the treatise *On Mystical Theology* exerted a profound and enduring influence on all Catholic writers on

mysticism. Father Sharpe's book is a valuable contribution to a subject which is little understood by many who have much to say about it.

WILLIAM TURNER.

Other World. By Harold B. Shephard, M. A. London, A. C. Fifield, 1910. Pp. 59. Price, 25 cents.

This little book appeals, as the author himself says, "neither to religion nor to philosophy, but to observation." Its contention is that we cannot understand such common things as "the tree, the spider, death, virtue, the night-sky" except on the supposition that, besides this world, the world of the senses, there is an "other world" that cannot be seen nor heard, nor touched; that cannot be weighed nor measured; that does not lie within the three dimensions; which is unknowable to the senses, and is known only by consciousness or by reasoning. The other-world is not a Platonic World of Ideas, nor a religious far-off heaven of rest and reward. It is the immaterial in the material world, the idealistic explanation of the real which surrounds us. The book, in fact, is a plea for the introduction of mind as an explanation of matter. It is original merely in the manner of its argument, and remarkable chiefly for the freshness with which it discusses a problem which is as old as philosophy itself. Its incidental discussion of pantheism is not without merit. "The immanence of God is a fashionable religious phrase. If they mean that His imaginations (*sic*) live in all lovely things, well and good. But, they say, can anything be outside of God? Pray God, much indeed. The shadow lives in the midst of a shining deep; but no darkness ever came out of light" (p. 56). The quotation will serve as a sample of the author's unconventional manner of dealing with the technicalities of philosophy.

WILLIAM TURNER.

Modern Biology and the Theory of Evolution. By Erich Wasmann, S. J. Translated by A. M. Buchanan, M. A. St. Louis, Herder, 1910. Pp. xxxii + 539. Price, \$4.50.

Catholics who are at a loss to know what a profound student

of biology and a competent critic of modern evolutionists thinks of the general theory of evolution and its relation to orthodoxy will find in this volume from the pen of the well-known Jesuit scientist the information they are seeking. The Christian apologist will do well to heed the warning "If Christianity is not to succumb to the attacks of monism based on natural philosophy, it must determine on bold action in the offensive; it must seize the enemies' arsenal, and, by accepting without reserve whatever is right in the theory of evolution, it will turn the opponents' weapons against themselves. In such proceedings caution is always advisable" (p. 278). The section entitled "Philosophical and Scientific Limitations of the Theory of Evolution" puts this principle into practice. We make no "concessions" to evolution, says Father Wasmann. Our philosophy bids us postulate the existence of an all-wise, all-powerful, personal Creator as the first cause, extraneous to the world, of the whole cosmos and the laws of its evolution. It teaches us that, to account for the origin of the first organisms, we must accept some special action, direct or indirect, on the part of the Creator, on matter. All the efforts of monism to set aside the first of these postulates are fruitless. As to the second, science by showing the absolute incompatibility of spontaneous generation with the laws of life as we know them, comes to the aid of Christian philosophy. Science, biological science, inclines us to make the further supposition that, since sensitive life is so superior to vegetative life, there was, in all probability, a distinction between plants and animals from the beginning, although this is not an unalterable philosophical postulate, like the first and second. The fourth postulate is one which like the first, is imposed on us inevitably by our knowledge, scientific and philosophical, of the nature of man. It is that "we can account for the existence of man only by assuming some special action on the part of the Creator. No evolution theory is capable of bridging the gulf between mind and matter, which, our experience teaches us, really exists." Having assigned these philosophical limits to the evolution-theory, Father Wasmann considers that the question of the extent of evolution within these limits is to be determined by the study of biological science. Here he meets the evolutionists on their own ground. The theistic interpretation of evolution, always supposing the above-mentioned limits, he set forth in his

famous lecture at Innsbruck in 1909: "A God who could create a living world capable of evolution is immeasurably greater and higher in His wisdom and power than a God who could only set all living creatures in the world, as fixed, unalterable automata. The greatest intellects of the middle ages and of antiquity, such as St. Thomas Aquinas and St. Augustine, perceived and expressed this truth" (p. 488).

Father Wasmann's book is not confined to a discussion of these questions, momentous as they are. It furnishes a good deal of information about the history of biology in ancient and modern times, and, as those who have followed his scientific career might have expected, brings forward a vast amount of curious and valuable information concerning the morphogeny of ants. The translation, made from the third German edition, is well done, and, on the whole, free from the faults of style which it is so difficult to avoid in rendering technical German phraseology into acceptable English.

WILLIAM TURNER.

MISCELLANEOUS.

The Economic Significance of Socialism.

A Synopsis of a Lecture delivered in McMahon Hall, March 2, 1911, by Frank O'Hara, Ph. D.

Economically speaking, modern socialism means collectivism. It means that the social group shall take charge of the material instruments of production, i. e., of capital and land, and carry on the production of wealth in the interest of the whole group. Compensation may or may not be made to present owners of capital. The idea of the confiscation of property is not essential to socialism. The distribution of wealth among the workers is to be made according to some more perfect principle than the present rough and ready one of competition. There is a strong feeling among socialists that the whole produce of labor ought to belong to the laborer. Some socialists, however, look forward to the time when human nature will be so perfected that the principle "to each according to his needs" may be applied practically.

Socialists may be roughly classified as utopian and scientific. Utopian socialism is a socialism of the imagination, a building up of ideal plans which overlook the stern realities of life. The utopian socialists live in the clouds. Scientific socialism—the socialism of Rodbertus and Lasselle and Marx and Engels—has renounced the use of the imagination and has come down to the material earth to dwell. Utopian socialism has been conservative. Scientific socialism is essentially critical. It is a criticism of the present industrial order and of orthodox political economy.

Scientific socialism as represented by Carl Marx emphasizes two main ideas: first, the labor theory of value, and second, the evolution of capital and the increasing misery of the masses leading inevitably to socialism.

Labor alone, says Marx, is productive of value. Land merely supplies the material to which labor gives value and capital is simply a stored-up form of labor. All value is due to labor alone. Capital is, indeed, necessary in production, says Marx, but it adds value to the product only in the degree in which it is itself the

product of labor. For example, an ax or a plane which it has cost one day's labor value to produce will, when it has been worn out, have added one day's labor value to the commodity which it was employed to produce. It will not have added one day's labor value and something else which might be considered interest. Similarly land does not add any value to its product, since land itself is not produced by labor. After a lengthy investigation of the subject Marx feels that he can account for the value of any article by a summing up of the value of the labor necessary for its production.

But if the whole of the value of an article is due to the labor which it contains, Marx would like to know how it happens that the owner of capital can get for it, not merely the labor value which it contains, but interest in addition. The capitalist, let us say, loans something which has cost a hundred dollars labor value. At the end of a year he gets back a hundred dollars of labor value and four or five dollars in addition. And how does it happen that the landlord can get a rent for the use of his land in spite of the fact that all of the value of the product of the land is due to labor?

Marx explains the origin of the two shares, interest and rent, in this way: the wage-earner is able to create more value by his daily labor than is required for his sustenance. By working for twelve hours he is able to create, let us say, three dollars' labor value. Six hours' labor is sufficient to support him in the standard of living of his class. The capitalist who is in possession of the material means of labor buys the wage earner's labor power. He pays for twelve hours, or one day of it, not the three dollars which it produces but one dollar and fifty cents which will allow the laborer to live according to his accepted standard of life. Out of the other dollar and fifty cents, which Marx calls surplus value, interest and rent are paid. In other words the origin of interest and rent is to be found in the robbery of the surplus value of the wage earner's labor which is made possible by the private ownership of capital and land.

Marx establishes the coming of the social revolution by an appeal to history and prophecy. He asks us to go back with him to the period following the overthrow of slavery and serfdom. At that time each peasant owned his own means of labor, that is, his own capital. There was little division of labor and the

conditions of life were primitive. At a certain stage of development this society brings forth the material means of its own dissolution. . . . New forces and new passions spring up in the bosom of society but the old social organism fetters them and keeps them down. Finally, the tension becomes too strong and the old organism is annihilated. The capital which was formerly individualized and scattered among the workers is now united. The pigmy property of the many becomes the huge capital of the few. The great mass of the people have been expropriated from the soil, from the means of subsistence and from the means of labor. The oppression and degradation and exploitation of the masses becomes greater and greater, but the numbers of the working class grow and its discipline is constantly improved. Centralization of capital and socialization of labor continue until they reach a point where the revolution is inevitable. The expropriators are expropriated. Class antagonism will then cease, because there will be only one class.

Scientific socialism brings two main charges against the existing economic order: first, that production is carried on in an inefficient manner as compared with what we may expect under socialism and secondly, that the prevailing method of distribution by which the social income is divided into wages, interest, rent and profits is in the highest degree unjust. Such is the indictment against things as they are. But when the Marxist is asked what substitution he proposes to make, he will answer that he has done enough when he has shown that the present economic order is unjust and that it contains principles which must inevitably lead to its overthrow. Society can be depended upon, he would say, to produce an improved system of production and distribution when the present one is overthrown.

The scientific socialist refuses to give a detailed picture of socialism in operation, and so we must have recourse to the utopian. In a volume which has appeared recently a socialist of this class has outlined a very definite plan. He has organized a holding company under the laws of Arizona with the purpose of consolidating all of the industries of the world. This company, known as World Corporation, is issuing shares of stock at the par value of a dollar each. With the money received for its stock and with the stock itself it intends to buy up one by one all of the great industries, just as the United States Steel Cor-

poration bought up the stock of its subsidiary companies. In the course of time World Corporation hopes to own the steel trust, the oil trust, the tobacco trust, the sugar trust, and all of the other trusts together with the industries that have not yet reached the stage of trustification. As soon as World Corporation gets control of all the industries in all of the countries of the world it will undertake to retire its stock. As fast as it accumulates its surplus it will buy up outstanding shares of its own stock and will cancel such shares as fast as they are bought up. When all of the shares of World Corporation have been bought up and cancelled, socialism will have arrived. World Corporation will no longer have shareholders to receive dividends, and hence it will no longer be necesasry to pay rent and interest and profits out of the social product. Of all the wealth that is produced a certain percentage will be set aside to keep social capital in repair; the rest, in so far as it is not used for public purposes, will go as wages. As the United States Steel Corporation or the Standard Oil Company now pay its managers high wages to get efficient results, so World Corporation will seek out the best administrative talent and will pay it well in order to get the benefit of its efficiency. The board of directors of World Corporation will be elected by the nations of the world. To the objection that a system where all men must work for one corporation is slavery, this utopian answers that it is true that if you have no money you must work under the World Corporation plan, but he contends that that is true now. But at any time under the new plan, if the laborer becomes dissatisised with his work or his manager he may seek a new position. The wage scheme will be arranged on much the same plan as at present. The managers of the various industries will, from time to time, issue a schedule of the wages they are paying. If more laborers enter a particular industry than are needed, the managers of this industry will know that the wages which they offer are too high, comparatively, and they will lower them. In other industries where too few laborers apply for work, wages will have to be raised to attract them. In the course of time it might be possible so to adjust wages in the different industries that little change would be necessary. Under the new plan no man would be deprived of his capital goods against his will. Each would be offered a fair price for his capital and if he did not choose

to sell he might keep it. He could not be permitted, however, to lend it at interest.

World Corporation is, of course, only one of a great many utopian schemes; but it is probably as strong a socialistic position as any and will serve as well as any to illustrate the principles of socialism. An adequate refutation of socialism cannot be presented here for lack of space; a few objections, however, may be briefly treated.

In the first place, agriculture cannot be carried on in the manner contemplated by World Corporation or any similar socialistic scheme. Extremely large scale production in agriculture is economically impossible. On account of the frequent changing from one occupation to another it is impossible for a foreman on a farm to oversee the work of a number of laborers in the way in which it can be done in a factory with its regularity of tasks. Take the case of a farmer who is engaged with half a dozen hired men in making hay. On a few minutes' notice a rain storm blows up, suspending hay making for the rest of the day. The farmer who must find work for his men as soon as the rain is over, sends two or three of them to cultivate corn, one or two to mend fence and the others to split wood. Now if the responsible overseer had instead of half a dozen men, a hundred or a thousand, it is easy to imagine that great waste of time would result in assigning them to new tasks. Agriculture is the weakest spot in socialism. This is indeed beginning to be realized by many collectivists, some of whom have given up hope of bringing agriculture under the sway of socialism. But socialism with the socialization of agriculture left out is no longer socialism, for the reason that values would continue to be regulated competitively.

A second objection has to do with capitalistic monopolies. The socialists claim that there is a natural and universal tendency towards monopoly in industry. This has by no means been established. There are of course industries in which there is a natural tendency towards monopoly. The railway business is an example of this kind. As you continue to add to the number of tons transported you decrease the cost per ton of transportation. There is a natural tendency here towards trustification. The greater the volume of business, the more economical will be the production. There are other industries in which small scale production is more economical than large scale production. And,

finally, there are industries in which large scale production is economical up to a certain point but as the enterprises become still vaster and more bulky their management becomes involved in red tape and a lessened efficiency results which is not overcome by further economies in the technical process of production. When industries of this kind are trustified, the impulse comes, not from the demand for more economical production, but from an artificial demand such as that of the stock market. Promoters and underwriters are anxious to secure profits, and innocent investors who know absolutely nothing about the relative merits of trusts and mere large scale production are willing to risk their money in any enterprise where large profits are prophesied. In any line of business where independent capital can enter and compete with the trust and make profits and compel the trust to buy up the new enterprise, it is certain there is no natural demand for monopoly. There may be an economic demand for large scale production, but as long as competition is possible there is no economic demand for socialism, while there may be strong economic reasons against it. In the case of real monopolies on the other hand it is not necessary to adopt socialism to secure all of the economies. The United States believes, for example, that it can control the railway business through a regulation of rates. If, however, this should be found impossible, public ownership of railways and of the few other real monopolies would not mean socialism.

A further argument against the practicability of socialism has to do with the opposition it would experience if it ever comes into operation. No human institution can stand out against a general and continued attack from all sides. Socialism is no exception to this rule. We are all constantly finding fault with some institution or other. When we travel we are likely to think that the fare is excessive; when we pay our gas bills it seems to us that the meter is defective; when we buy woolen clothing we are suspicious as to the presence of the wool; when we compare our incomes with those of persons with whom we associate we feel that we are unjustly discriminated against. In all of these cases there is little that we can do but grumble. But if the Government or World Corporation or any socialistic institution owned the railways and the gas plants and the clothing stores and all other businesses, and were the sole employer of all of us,

all of the grumblers, and that would mean by far the larger part of the population, would be able to concentrate their hostility upon a very definite objection. Even if socialism were a very respectable institution it would not be able to live under such an attack.

St. Thomas of Aquin.

At the High Mass celebrated in McMahon Hall on March 7 in honor of St. Thomas, Patron of the Faculty of Philosophy, the sermon was preached by Reverend Doctor Turner. The speaker said in part :

"The wise man will seek out the wisdom of all the ancients, and will be occupied in the prophets. He will keep the sayings of renowned men and will enter withal into the subtleties of parables. . . . Many shall praise his wisdom, and it shall never be forgotten. The memory of him shall not depart away, and his name shall be in request from generation to generation."—*Ecclesiasticus*, xxxix, 1-13.

In studying the revealed mysteries of religion, in commemorating the lives of the saints and appreciating the work which they accomplished, we are in danger of attending only to the supernatural, and of overlooking the important part which nature, unadorned, often unregenerate, nature, plays in the dealings of God with men. Yet, we ought to see God in the Natural as well as in the Supernatural; one order is truly the work of Divine Wisdom as the other; both orders are but imperfect glimpses of Him, partial, onesided, surface-presentations of the one Divine Idea—they are, when we consider it, a manifestation; the distinction between them does not appear but on the application of a relative test, the capacity of our created nature. Besides, what God reveals we must believe, but unless we assume a close relation, an intimate union, between the world of truth above us and the truths which are attainable by our natural mental powers, a science of the supernatural is impossible. Thus it is that grace presupposes natural virtue, and the science of things divine is intimately allied with the science of nature.

God, in His infinite love, has safeguarded and with unbounded patience renewed and enriched the treasure of His divine revelation. Having once spoken to the human mind in supernatural revelation,

He took pains to preserve among men the truths which He revealed. The history of the Old Testament and of the New Dispensation is the story of God's jealous care that man should know the truth and of man's perverse proneness to error. From the earliest times the struggle has gone on, until one would have thought that even a God of infinite patience could no longer endure man's obstinate hatred of the light, and still God watched, and still He watches over the truths which He revealed.

Such being God's care that men should know and love the truth that is above them, what shall we say of His care for truth of the natural order? Saul, by express command of Jehovah Himself, was anointed at the hands of a prophet; Augustus attained the throne by ambition, corruption and civil strife. Think you that the Roman Empire was therefore less an object of solicitude to the ruler of the destinies of man than the establishment of a kingdom in Judea? Think you that the rise and fall of nations, the growth of industry, the development of the arts, changes which transform whole peoples, inventions which revolutionize the conditions of life, are not a part, and an important part, of the plan of Divine Providence? We have the Bible, and we are grateful for the lessons which it teaches; we reverence its authority because it is God's own book. Nay, it is but one of His books; the other is the great open book of Nature, whose laws proclaim in capital type the existence, the power, the wisdom, the justice, the goodness of the Creator. Inspired? Yes, though in a different sense, and more than inspired, because written by the very hand of God Himself. Shall we then say that when the leaves of that book of nature are turned, and some new chapter of its contents is read to us by a Plato, an Aristotle or a Newton, that He "who enlighteneth every man that cometh into the world" hath not so ordained?

There is a divine purpose running through the ages, and blending, as in the individual, so in the universe of nature and of human nature, the Natural and Supernatural. There are in some churches and places of Europe some rare old tapestries which men with infinite skill and patience have wrought from many-colored threads into designs of exquisite beauty. But, to him who is blind to some of the colors employed, such works of art must appear to be nothing but incomprehensible medlies. In like manner, he cannot hope to realize the perfect beauty of God's

Providence who fails to see the Natural interwoven with the Supernatural in the intellectual destinies of man.

Thus it was that, while the chosen people of God, heedless of the prophet, deaf to every appeal of supernatural truth, was continuing to earn for itself the epithet "stiffnecked," there was springing up among the sons of Japhet a nation destined to exert influence on the world in the era that was then being prepared. Greece, the land of the physical ideal, the home of poetry, the birthplace of science, the cradle of philosophy, seems to have been set aside from the beginning to play a sublime part in the history of ideas. Stains there are, and great ones, in the character of even the most perfect of her sages. Still as we turn to Greece from the recollection of her pagan contemporaries we feel like one who leaves the fetid air of the marshland for the pure clear atmosphere of the windswept shore of the Mediterranean. When Christ came, and taught, the days of Greece's intellectual supremacy were passing away; Plato and Aristotle had founded no enduring school; their disciples had already begun to pervert the doctrines of the masters. Nevertheless, as Rome was the political, so Greece was still the intellectual mistress of the world, when the new dispensation was vouchsafed. And, as the Jews, when they went forth from the bondage of Egypt, took with them the gold and precious ornaments belonging to their oppressors, so, says St. Augustine, did Christianity come out from paganism bringing with her the riches of the best of pagan thought.

It is in the light of these principles that I would invite you this morning to look at the work accomplished by St. Thomas. I would call your attention especially to the truth, now so generally acknowledged, that the life of humanity is continuous, that the work which was pre-eminently our saint's was not his exclusively. It is God's design that the Natural and the Supernatural should blend in one harmonious system of thought. The Fathers, from Justin onward, took up this idea. The Apologists contributed to its realization. St. Augustine strove for it with the zeal of a St. Paul and the sublimity of a Plato. Albert, the many-gifted, untiring predecessor and teacher of St. Thomas, worked for it throughout his long career. But, in comprehensiveness of view, in thoroughness of method, and completeness of result, St. Thomas outshone all his predecessors in this line. I might, on this, his feast day, recall the events of his early life, and show how, in

common with other servants of God, he was tried by suffering and temptation. I might dwell on his wonderful humility, his still more marvelous patience, his love of solitude and study, his talent for prayer and meditation on spiritual truth. But I prefer to note the traits which were peculiar to him. While yet a mere child playing in the solemn cloisters of Monte Cassino, he would awe the pious Benedictine monks by his precocious questions concerning the nature of God. In Naples he distinguished himself by the zeal with which he pursued the study of philosophy under the guidance of Pietro d'Hibernia. A captive for conscience sake in the mountain fortress of San Giovanni, he delighted in the study of him whom he loved to call the philosopher. Later, over rough ways, through steep, untravelled mountain passes, he journeyed into distant Germany, where, under the direction of the great Albert, he first studied and then assumed the office of teacher. At Cologne, at Paris, at Rome, and elsewhere, he taught and preached. Wherever he taught, pupils flocked from every nation in Europe to hear him. Wherever he preached, the word of God, falling from his lips, wrought wonders. All this time, he prayed and wrote, until at the early age of forty-seven he laid down his pen and whispered with dying breath his exposition of the song of mystic love, leaving unfinished his masterpiece of theology, the most perfect exposition of Christian doctrine. He preached and taught; he prayed and wrote. Such was his life. It was not what one would call an eventful life, unless we say that it was a life in which ideas were events. The predilection which he is said to have shown for Greek philosophy in his youth lasted to the end of his days. Others had explained and expounded Christian truths in the language and in the mould of Greek thought. He was the first to conceive and execute successfully a complete synthesis of Christian revelation on the principles of the Greek masters. He was the first in the medieval times to present a system of theology "clad in a panoply that is proof against the blow of the heretic and the thrust of the unbeliever."

But that was not all that he accomplished. They do less than justice to St. Thomas who see in his writings merely a refutation of the errors of his time. It is true that in his day a new spirit Aristotelianism was threatening the foundations of faith, that the Rationalists of Paris, in sympathy with the heretics of

Languedoc, if not actually in league with them, were using the name and reputation of Aristotle against the authority of the Church; it is true that St. Thomas, throwing himself boldly into the intellectual strife, wrenched the sword from the grasp of the Church's opponents and used it against them. But this is not the whole truth. In the work of St. Thomas one may see not merely a measure of defense, not simply the arrest of a counter movement, but a positive phase of thought, a natural, long looked for step in the direction of intellectual progress, a true evolution, a growth from the less perfect to the more perfect. The Patristic Age had chosen Plato as the philosopher whose principles best accorded with Christianity. The dreamer, the poet, the idealist was a powerful ally in the struggle against the sordid, material views of a world steeped in pagan luxury and weakened by self-indulgence. When all the institutions of paganism were going to ruin, undermined by the vices of over-civilization, it was natural to turn to a thinker who pointed ever to a better, a truer, a more beautiful world above us. St. Augustine and his Platonism suited the decadent Latin civilization of the fifth century. But, since that time the face of Europe had been changed, and a new spirit had entered into Latin civilization. The Celt and the Teuton had come into the Christian commonwealth; a race of vigorous, inquisitive, constructive Christians had sprung up and were now demanding a synthesis of Christian thought on lines less idealistic and more scientific, less fanciful and more solid, less in the spirit of other worldliness and more in the spirit of this worldliness. The Europe of the thirteenth century found more in Aristotle than in Plato. Plato's conceptions were grand, sublime, uplifting; Aristotle's were solid, far-reaching and scientifically accurate. Each had his defects, and each had his claim to supremacy. St. Thomas saw the defects of both, and, with a confidence born of humility, viewing both systems from the higher plane of Christian philosophy, he evolved from materials furnished by them a system of natural truth which, while it is in perfect harmony with Christian revelation, is, apart altogether from revelation, the crowning and consummation of the best efforts of human thought. It is true that St. Thomas is an Aristotelian in the same sense in which St. Augustine is a Platonist. But what an improvement on the cold, calm, unsympathetic Stagyrte. The

philosophy of Aristotle stands forth noble and majestic, like the Parthenon which crowned the hill over-looking the groves where he taught; but, like the great temple of Minerva, it is severe in its strict conformity to principle, uninviting, unconsoling. Thomas presents a system of thought, rich, almost exuberant, in its chastened spiritual imaginativeness, from every detail of which the mind is led inevitably to something beyond and above us, like the grand old Gothic pile which now stands on the Rhine's bank in the city where he first sat at the feet of Albert. If St. Augustine is the Plato of Christianity, St. Thomas is its Aristotle, but an Aristotle, christianized, transformed, transfused with Christian feeling, almost, one might say, an Aristotle transfigured.

Such is the work of St. Thomas. I have said that that work is not his exclusively, that the life of humanity is continuous, that there is an onward movement, if not always true progress, in human thought. The problem which confronted St. Thomas belongs not to any one age nor to any one period of history; it affects the intellectual destinies of Christians in every age and in every clime. In its general terms it is always the same—Reason and Revelation, Science and Faith, Philosophy and Theology—but in details it is always assuming new phases. The task which St. Thomas undertook is for ever renewing itself, and must be solved by each generation of Christians as it presents itself to them. How, and in what terms does it confront us? A careful study of the modern world of thought will reveal, I think, a curious condition of affairs. Science, where it has kept within its own sphere, has made marvelous progress; it has achieved wonderful results, and every new fact which it reveals, every new secret which it has wrested from nature is to the reverent minded but a new manifestation of the Author of all things. With science within those limits no Christian will quarrel. It is different with the philosophy of the modern era. Judged by its general aim the philosophy of the day has simply failed in its mission. Its last word, its final solution of every problem, is a flippant despair of knowing anything. On the great problems: What is the soul? Whence is it? Whither does it go? on the nature and origin of the universe, on the nature and value of knowledge, the last message of modern thought is "We know not." Years of speculation, of research, of laborious investigation, have resulted in this anti-climax. We have had criticism, analysis,

destruction, but where has there been a successful attempt at construction? There are many hands ready to tear down, but as soon as one is stretched out to lay brick on brick or stone on stone, the cry of the Agnostic is heard: "Beware, the foundation is not secure." Great minds, as great perhaps, as Plato's or Aristotle's, have wrestled with the problem of life; their earnestness is worthy of praise; their analysis calls for our admiration at their skill; but the mind of man imperatively demands a system, not the *disjecta membra* of a system; its need is a synthesis of truth, not a collection of facts. What, then can the Christian philosopher do but turn elsewhere for assistance, and elsewhere, I believe, St. Thomas would have turned did he live today. The light that science has thrown on the problems of life he would have accepted with gladness; but, in the science of sciences, in the final synthesis of knowledge, he would have taken the stand which he took more than six hundred years ago. He would have raised experience to the rank of a guiding principle, but, not stopping at the surface, he would have passed beyond experience from effect to cause, from appearance to reality, from the phenomenon to the law of substance. The use of the telescope and the microscope, the precision of laboratory methods have brought to light facts which would have changed many details and reversed opinions on many points of natural science, but the conception of the soul, of its nature, operations and immortality, the dualistic conception of the universe as a combination of the actual and the potential—all these would have remained the cardinal principles of his system of thought. But these principles, you may object, are the common heritage of all Christians. They are, or some of them, at least, are; but to whom, under God, do we owe them? Without explanation they could never have survived, and to whom but to St. Thomas do we own that explanation?

I am conscious that I have led you into thoughts but indirectly connected with the feast which we are gathered here to celebrate. Yet, how can we honor the great Doctor of the Church, the Prince of Christian philosophers, better than by speaking of his work? His work was his life; his intellectual labors are hardly distinguishable from his practice of piety. The order of St. Dominic has given to the Church many a saint and many a scholar. But never a more scholarly saint nor a more saintly scholar than St. Thomas of Aquin. And if, as all Catholics believe, the spirits of the heroic dead hover round the scenes of their labor as

tutelary saints, and continue by a spiritual presence to promote the work which interested them in life—if the Princes of the Apostles are special patrons of the city on the seven hills, and Peter and Paul still watch on the banks of the Tiber with keys and sword; if the gentle Francis still breathes the spirit of simple piety on the peaceful plains of Umbria, and still tames many a wolfish heart in the castled towns of Tuscany; if the other Francis still seconds the efforts of our missionaries in the Far East and sustains them in their heroic task; then, surely, in this institution of learning, founded by the authority which he so strenuously upheld, devoted to sacred truth which he so ardently loved, here where his spirit is in the heart and his name often on the lips of every teacher of sacred science, here where our only justification of the task we are engaged in is the idea which inspired him, here the great, calm, majestic soul of St. Thomas is surely present as a benediction and an inspiration. May it always be so. May the day never come when his authority will be set aside, his guidance neglected, his example ignored, his doctrines held in less esteem than they are now. On the contrary, as this institution grows in numbers and in influence and in usefulness, may the blessing of his patronage grow more fruitful, the inspiration of his example more potent, and the authority of his teaching more helpful; so that here, in this university, the prophecy may be fulfilled: “The memory of him shall not depart away, and his name shall be in request from generation to generation.”

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY SUMMER SCHOOL.

The Catholic University of America has issued a handsome prospectus of the Summer School for Teaching Sisters and Laywomen, which it will conduct from the third of July until the seventh of August of this year. This booklet has been sent to every parochial school and academy taught by sisters in the United States and to as many Catholic laywomen interested in education as the university has been able to reach by mail. The prospectus is profusely illustrated and contains a spirited description of the university and the City of Washington. Copies will be sent on request to all who desire further information concerning the summer school.

When the first announcement of the summer school went out to the hierarchy, one of the most scholarly bishops of America wrote to Monsignor Shahan: "I am heartily in sympathy with the movement. Much will depend on the character of the course itself—that is, are these studies to be regular classes in definite branches of study, say of mathematics, physics, chemistry, English literature and the like, just as in college? Lectures are good enough in a way, but what is needed is close and constant study, regular recitations and teaching. Another item of importance is the cost, the price of tuition and of board and lodging. These are vital to our poor communities." The prospectus answers these questions most satisfactorily.

The trustees of the university have authorized a normal institute for teaching sisters (which laywomen may also attend) in the immediate vicinity of the university under its direction. The summer school is, in fact, the first step taken towards the realization of this project. Work done in the summer school will count towards the degrees that will later be granted by the Normal Institute, on the basis of one full course at the summer school equalling two hours a week for half a year in the institute. With few exceptions the courses of the summer school demand five hours class-room work each week of the five that the summer school is in session. Laboratory courses call for twice as much time. Registration commences Saturday, July first. Examinations will be held Saturday, August 5. The other Saturdays will be devoted to excursions to the many points of natural beauty and

historical interest in which the near neighborhood of Washington abounds.

The courses of instruction announced at present are as follows: Logic, Professor Turner; Problems in the Philosophy of the Mind, Professor Pace; Educational Psychology, Professor Moore; History of Education, Professor Pace, Professor Turner, Professor McCormick; High School Methods of Teaching Algebra, Professor Landry; of History, Professor McCarthy; of English, Professor Hemelt; Primary Methods of Education, Training the Backward Child, Teaching the Subjects in a Modern School Curriculum, Miss Maguire, supervising principal of the Western Grammar School, Philadelphia; the Principles of Education, a series of lectures by the celebrated authority, Dr. Thomas Edward Shields, of the university faculty; Physical Defects of Children, with living subjects on exhibition, Dr. Francis A. Schneider, M. D.; English Literature and Theme Writing, Professor Hemelt; two courses in French, Professor Teillard; two in German, and one in Spanish, Professor Furger; courses in Latin and Greek as demanded; General Church History and American Constitutional History, Professor McCarthy; General Biology and the Structure and Physiology of Plants, Professor Parker; Chemistry, General and Qualitative Analysis, Professor Wagner; Physics, lectures, experiments, problems, and reading, Instructor Crook; Astronomy, lectures and practical work, Professor Doolittle; Algebra, Geometry and Plane Trigonometry, Professor Landry; Art, freehand drawing and outdoor sketching, Professor Murphy; Music, art of singing, vocal training of school children, Gregorian chant, harmony, counterpoint and musical composition, Professor Gabert; Library Science, history, works of reference, systems of classifications, cataloguing practical work and visits to Washington libraries.

The City of Washington is itself a great school, presenting educational advantages of the richest and most varied character. The general Government spends eight millions annually in scientific research and several private institutions aggregate possibly a million more. The Government has thus brought to the city an unparalleled force of scientists. Their laboratoires are by act of Congress accessible to students of educational institutions situated in the District, while their influence and assistance are generously at the disposal of the student investigators. Museums, libraries, art galleries, public monuments and the like make Washington unique among American cities as the best equipped

home of study along all educational lines. The summer school will be careful to give its students the greatest possible benefit of the advantages afforded by the city, including lectures at the summer school by distinguished men, thus bringing the students into personal contact with the National Government.

The fifteen buildings making up the university group and comprising the affiliated colleges, offer in themselves rare opportunities for the improvement of class-room workers. Laboratories, museums, libraries, art collections, the entire expensive outfit of the university environment, will be at the command of the students and will be explained by university instructors. Halls on the campus will be conducted as summer school convents, where the sisters will be cared for handsomely at the rate of one dollar per day, ample preparations having been perfected to attend to all their needs and make the sojourn delightful.

Laywomen may board on the same terms in private families in the town of Brookland adjoining the university, and also in the city at hotels which have made special rates varying from \$4.25 a week to \$10.00 a day. Special railway rates have been promised providing those expecting to attend will write promptly to the registrar of the university and thus enable him to make advantageous contracts with the various passenger associations. The summer school fees will be \$10.00 for one course, \$20.00 for more than one, and, in laboratory courses, \$5.00 extra. There is no registration fee or charge for public lectures.

This announcement marks an epoch in the history of Catholic education in America. The teaching sisters of the country, fully abreast of the times, have attended, whenever possible, the summer schools conducted by secular universities. Now the Catholic University of America, easily the peer of any other American university in its teaching capacity, opens its doors to the Catholic teachers with a fully organized pedagogical school which will insure the most congenial surroundings, the truest proportions of curriculum and the inspiring atmosphere of Catholic scholarship, to those teachers whose life is one long act of devotion to the Faith. The good results to be expected from this departure are incalculable. Every Catholic should do all in his power to make this first session of the summer school popular, so that the developments to follow, the foundation of the Normal Institute and the permanent service of the university to the women teachers of America, can be made sure for all time.

"GIBBONS MEMORIAL HALL."

The committee in charge of the proposed Cardinal Gibbons Memorial Hall of the Catholic University, Washington, reports rapid and satisfactory progress. The circular printed below has been sent to every Catholic priest in the United States, and from all quarters a generous response is coming in. Bishop Corrigan is daily in receipt of numerous letters from every State in the Union, containing generous donations, and expressing the deep respect and affection in which Cardinal Gibbons is universally held. Many members of the hierarchy have already contributed very generously, and it is expected that eventually most of the Catholic clergy will have done their full share in the creation of this noble educational monument. The educational feature of the Memorial Hall, and its permanent character appeal strongly to all, likewise its location at the National Capital, where it will be forever visible to visitors from all parts, and will keep alive most efficiently the memory of the great American cardinal to whom religion and country are so much indebted.

A similar circular is now being widely distributed among the Catholic laity throughout the United States and it is certain that a very generous response will come from their ranks. Though a very staunch churchman, the Cardinal is often known as "the layman's Cardinal," not only because of his affable and urbane manner, but also because he has always advocated the religious and patriotic interests of the laity and on countless occasions has acted as their spokesman and champion. Many non-Catholics have already signified their desire to contribute to the Gibbons Memorial Hall, in recognition of the important services rendered by the Cardinal to American democracy, of which he has always been a fearless and enthusiastic exponent. There is probably no community in the United States where he is not deeply respected by all classes for his advocacy of the great essentials of our national life. In both of the great political parties he counts many warm friends and admirers, who rejoice that a fitting memorial will soon be erected to him at the National Capital.

Archbishop Keane of Dubuque writes:

"My whole heart goes out in response to your appeal for the Cardinal Gibbons Memorial Hall in the Catholic University of America. Our Cardinal and our University are the two objects that stand highest, and deservedly so, in the hearts of American Catholics. Success, fullest and most generous success, to this admirable project for linking them together in a monumental structure at the University."

Coadjutor-Bishop Grimes of Syracuse writes:

"I feel as you do that the occasion will be embraced by the clergy and the laity of the country to express their esteem and affection for this remarkable man who is the idol of the American people and the champion at all times of the doctrines of our Church."

Father Railliere, the oldest priest in New Mexico and parish priest of Tome for fifty-three years, born in the same year as the Cardinal, sends his contribution with interesting reminiscences of the days when the Cardinal was the youngest bishop at the Vatican Council, the "boy bishop" as one of the old cardinals was wont affectionately to call him.

Justice McDonough of Fall River, Mass., writes

"I enclose my mite for a few bricks or stones for the Cardinal Gibbons Hall. Cardinal Gibbons is the pride of the Catholic Church in the United States, and while we cherish him living, we should do all we can to revere and perpetuate his memory when God, in His own good time, shall have called him to Himself.

One of the legion of the Cardinal's admirers.

This delightful letter brought the very first contribution to the fund the day after it was first announced in the Baltimore papers.

The Memorial Hall will be erected on the finest site of the University grounds, and when completed will be a notable addition to the numerous fine buildings that now form the chief attraction of the Brookland suburb. While plans have not been definitely accepted, a noble Tudor Gothic building is contemplated, to provide comfortable residence for one hundred and fifty collegiate

and graduate students. The University has just finished a large central heat, light and power plant, so that ample provision is now made for heating and lighting at the least possible expense the present plant and all future buildings that go up on the campus. In this way the entire space of the new hall will be devoted to educational uses. Externally and internally it will meet all the demands made on such an edifice by modern architectural progress. For this purpose a careful study has been made of all the best features of such residence buildings at Princeton, Yale, Columbia and elsewhere, with a view of embodying them in the new edifice. The Memorial Hall will be eventually ornamented with a statue of the Cardinal and his official coat of arms will be sculptured over the entrance.

Among the Catholic fraternal societies the Ancient Order of Hibernians and their Ladies' Auxiliary have already signified officially their intention to make a notable contribution to the new Memorial Hall. Eventually, the University grounds will be encircled by a series of similar residence halls whose architectural unity and symmetry will give the great institution the appearance of an American Oxford.

The following is the text of the circular sent out by the Committee:

DEAR FRIEND:

The Golden Jubilee or fiftieth anniversary of the ordination of Cardinal Gibbons to the priesthood occurs this year, also the twenty-fifth anniversary of his elevation to the august senate of the Apostolic See. His countless friends and admirers believe that these events should not go unrecognized, and desire to enroll your good-will and your personal co-operation in offering to our eminent fellow-citizen a tribute worthy of his high office and of the place he has so long filled in the life of our nation.

It is proposed to erect on the ground of the Catholic University a CARDINAL GIBBONS MEMORIAL HALL of residence for lay students, a noble edifice that shall forever bear his name, and while rendering the most useful service to a rapidly growing school, shall remind all who come after us that we appreciated fully and in his own day the unique influence of Cardinal Gibbons in our national life. It is known that he cares for no other recognition, but is willing that the many friends, both in and out

of the Church, who in his long career as a minister of Jesus Christ and an American citizen have profited by his discourses, his writings, or his example, should unite to erect an edifice that shall stand before the youth of our country for the highest education, the purest religion, and the most exalted patriotism.

Since its opening in 1889 the chief interest of Cardinal Gibbons has been the Catholic University of America. He was the leader in its foundation, and is now its head and governor. In his mind, as in that of the American Catholic hierarchy whom he represents, this great school, the official work of our hierarchy and our people, is destined to render the highest services to the Catholic Church in the United States, not only in the defence and illustration of religious truth, but also as a public monumental witness to the immemorial love of learning that characterizes our Catholic people and their patriotic devotion to the moral and social welfare of our country.

It may be truly said that in respect of the teachings and spirit of Catholicism, the loyalty of Catholics to this glorious republic, and the perfect sympathy between our American democracy and the Catholic Church, Cardinal Gibbons has been for fifty years a foremost educator of the American people. He has dispelled immemorial prejudice, has destroyed in no small measure the roots of fear and suspicion, and has freed the American people from many anti-Catholic delusions that held them in mental bondage. On the other hand he has inspired by word and example his Catholic fellow-citizens to lives of the highest virtue, and has never failed, in season and out of season, to impress upon them the majesty of the American State and its rights to our utmost love and devotion.

When Cardinal Gibbons began his priestly career there were scarcely three thousand priests in the vast territory of the United States, and the Catholic layman had almost to apologize for being a member of the ancient faith, whereas now there are over sixteen thousand priests, and the wisest statesmen admit that the Catholic Church is the nation's chief bulwark against the many evil forces that are threatening the peace, if not the existence, of the world's greatest republic.

In this happy development of Catholicism Cardinal Gibbons has had a large and important rôle. While never failing to emphasize the great substantial truths of religion and their endless

service to the common welfare, he has devoted his best thought and endeavor, by ceaseless preaching of the Word of God, by personal instruction and by books of unparalleled success, to making known the beauty, the power, and the charm of our immemorial Catholicism, its visible roots in the Gospel and in human nature, its beneficent career in the history of mankind, its sun-like vigor in creating and sustaining new and useful institutions.

For fifty years he has moved with unbroken success as an official exponent of Catholicism and has earned at all times not only the love and respect of his own fellow-citizens, both in and out of the Church, but also the commendation of the highest authority in the Church itself. As a priest of God he has lived in this half century a blameless and edifying life, has daily brought to the Catholic people all the divine consoling ministrations of their religion, has preached without ceasing and in its simple purity the saving Gospel of Christ, and in the fulfillment of this ministry has won the love and admiration, not only of his Catholic fellow-citizens, but of a multitude of other right-minded men. As a citizen he stands second to none for constant and active devotion to the principles and the spirit of American democracy. He has never tired of inculcating on all the duty of patriotism not only in eloquent and forcible language, but by his own example, in many acts of public service, in spirited defence and ardent praise of our American commonwealth, and in timely warning of the dangers that beset our path when we abandon the teachings and the example of the founders of the nation. As a man, his plain unassuming manner, his frugal habits and simple life, his industry, self-restraint and regularity, offer to all, and especially to our American youth, a model that cannot be too highly commended amid the acknowledged excesses of our civilization. His love of the lowly and oppressed, and his readiness to defend their cause, have won world-wide recognition, likewise his steady insistence on equity and fair play in all the economic and social relations of our American life.

As a bishop he has administered with paternal mildness the parent see of our American Catholic hierarchy and has maintained and confirmed its glorious Catholic traditions of religion and patriotism that began with Archbishop Carroll, and it is hoped will never suffer an eclipse. His house has been ever hospitably open to his Episcopal brethren from every quarter of the world,

and with equal generosity his good offices have been always at their disposal. It is under Cardinal Gibbons that took place the most striking events of our Catholic public life in the latter quarter of the nineteenth century, the Third Plenary Council of Baltimore, the First Centenary of the foundation of our hierarchy, the first Catholic Congress, the foundation at Washington of the Catholic University and the establishment of the Apostolic Delegation. In countless ways he has co-operated with the hierarchy of the United States for the welfare of religion, and by his prudence and experience, as well as by his insight and sympathy, has rendered to all his brethren of the episcopate, individually and collectively, services whose number and importance the Holy Spirit alone could reveal. Meanwhile he has consecrated to their great tasks one quarter of the American hierarchy, and has ordained about two thousand priests, nor has this exhausted his devotion to the Catholic clergy, for he had found time in his busy life to write for them one of the most beautiful books on the priestly life.

As a Cardinal of the Holy Roman Church, besides earning the love and approbation of two of the most remarkable successors of St. Peter, he has represented with equal dignity and success the general interests of our American Catholicism, and on all occasions has so borne himself as to leave room only for praise. It was, indeed, easy for him to continue always affable, gentle, and approachable; to remain unchanged in priestly life and spirit; to retain his modest and toilsome habit of life, but it gave to all, both Catholic and non-Catholic, particular pleasure when it was seen that the leader of the American Catholic hierarchy always spoke and acted with becoming tact, with judicious acumen, with a broad discriminating sense of principles and circumstances, with Catholic frankness, but also with patriotic ardor, while no one could mistake his charitable anxiety not to wound unnecessarily the feelings of our non-Catholic fellow-citizens, so well and widely known to him in the fifty years of his priestly ministrations.

In his eloquent discourse "The Church and the Age," Archbishop Ireland rightly says that "the work of Cardinal Gibbons forms an epoch in the history of the Church in America. He has made known, as no one before him did, the Church to the people of America. * * * Through his action the scales have fallen from the eyes of non-Catholics and prejudices have vanished." Recently, on his death-bed, Archbishop Ryan said to

the Cardinal, "I am now, as I ever have been, profoundly convinced that you are the instrument of Providence for the promotion of every good thing for our Church and our Country." And a prominent writer only echoes the conclusions of these distinguished prelates, when he says that "Cardinal Gibbons has been heard on every question of morals, public policy, or political economy that has agitated the nation since he became the head of the American Catholic hierarchy, and has always said the right thing at the right time."

Such a life calls for no small or transitory memorial, circumscribed by narrow limits. It is believed that the American people will desire to see preserved for all time the memory and the honor of the good Cardinal in the Capital of the Nation, and in such a way that his personality shall forever continue among us a religious, educational, and patriotic force.

If the subscriptions are numerous and generous enough, the trustees of the University will proceed quickly to the erection of the new Cardinal Gibbons Hall, so that it may be practically finished on October 30, when the Cardinal will celebrate solemnly the two anniversaries of his ordination to the priesthood and his elevation to the Cardinalate.

Your voluntary contribution is respectfully solicited. Any sum, however small, will be thankfully received and will be duly recorded in a great album always accessible to visitors. The names of those who contribute five hundred dollars or more will be inscribed on suitable tablets in the vestibule of the new Hall, while members of the University, professors and students, will never cease to remember gratefully and to pray for the generous donors.

All checks should be made payable to RT. REV. OWEN B. CORRIGAN, D. D., TREASURER, 1611 Baker Street, Baltimore, Md., and all correspondence should be addressed to VERY REV. GEORGE A. DOUGHERTY, D. D., Vice-Rector, Catholic University, Washington, D. C.

Very respectfully yours in Xto,

OWEN B. CORRIGAN, *Bishop of Macra.*

President of the Committee and Treasurer.

UNIVERSITY CHRONICLE.

Gift of Plowden's Commentaries. By the generosity of the late Mrs. Michael Jenkins a very rare law book has been added to the University Library. This is the Commentaries on the Common Law of England, by Sir Edward Plowden, a prominent judge in the reign of Queen Elizabeth. The work is a classic in its kind. It is written mostly in the old Norman French of the English law-courts, though some cases are in Latin or English.

The edition is one of the earliest, and the title page reads: "1571. Les Commentaries, ou les Reportes de Edmund Plowden un apprentice de le comen Ley, de dyvers cases esteantes matters en ley, et de les Argumentes sur yceux, en les temps des Raygues le Roye Edwarde de Size, le Roigne Mary, le Roy et Roigne Phillipp et Mary, et le Roigne Elizabeth. In Ædibus Richardi Tottelli, Octobris 24. Cum privilegio."

Annual Retreat. The Annual Retreat for the students of theology began on Ash Wednesday, March 1, and ended on Sunday, March 5. The exercises were conducted by Reverend John J. Wynne, S. J.

Feast of St. Thomas. On March 7, the Feast of St. Thomas, patronal feast of the Faculty of Philosophy, was celebrated at MacMahon Hall. The celebrant of High Mass was Very Reverend Richard S. Cartwright, C. S. P., President of the Paulist House of Studies. The preacher was the Reverend William Turner, S. T. D.

Lectures by Reverend Dr. Fox. Reverend Dr. Fox, Associate Professor of Ethics, is delivering a course of lectures at the Catholic Club, New York, under the auspices of the

Catholic Summer School of America. The following are the dates and subjects:

March 3—The Socialistic Movement and Socialism.

March 10—The Bible and Socialism.

March 17—Socialistic Aims and Constructive Schemes.

March 24—The Fundamental Errors of the Socialist Philosophy.

March 31—The Right of Ownership.

April 7—The Attitude of the Catholic Church toward the Socialist Movement.

Lectures by Reverend Drs. Shields and Pace. The Reverend Doctors Shields and Pace, of the Faculty of Philosophy, are giving a course of lectures at Worcester, Mass., under the auspices of the Catholic Women's League. The dates and subjects are:

March 6—The Church and the Teacher (Dr. Shields).

March 21—The Church and the Child (Dr. Shields).

April 28—The Church and the Citizen (Dr. Pace).

May 4—The Church and the Scientist (Dr. Pace).

The University Symposium. The first number of the *University Symposium* appeared in February. The editors, who were selected from the student body, intend publishing three issues during the remainder of the scholastic year. Beginning with next October, they intend to publish a number each month of the scholastic year, at the annual subscription price of two dollars. The price for the three numbers published this year is fifty cents.

The *Bulletin* hails with joy this latest evidence of literary and academic activity among the lay students of the University, and wishes the *University Symposium* many years of success and prosperity.

NECROLOGY.

MRS. MARY ISABELLA PLOWDEN JENKINS.

The University extends to its respected treasurer, Mr. Michael Jenkins, Esq., sincere sympathy for the loss of his beloved wife, Mrs. Mary Isabella Plowden Jenkins, who departed this life at Baltimore, March 5, fortified by the rites of Holy Church.

Mrs. Jenkins was at all times a devoted friend of the University, and a notable benefactress. More than once, and in various ways, she came to its assistance, and from its foundation never failed to follow with lively interest its growth. She was among the prominent members of the Cathedral parish, and during her long life was a most generous supporter of all its works and charities, being particularly devoted to his Eminence, Cardinal Gibbons, and ready at all times to second his efforts for the welfare of our holy religion. It may be said without exaggeration that her Catholic generosity came to her not unnaturally, for she was a lineal descendant of Sir Edmund Plowden, a renowned English judge in the time of Queen Elizabeth, and who remained to the end loyal to the old religion.

The last words Mrs. Jenkins wrote were on the fly leaf of a very rare early edition of this illustrious lawyer's "Commentaries" that she presented to the Universtiy Library.

While she lived, her modest and unassuming nature made it impossible to learn all the good she did without ceasing, but it could not escape the recording angel, and surely won for her a speedy entrance into life eternal. R. I. P.
